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Abstract
This research, sponsored by the Department of Defense Systems Engineering Re-
search Center, developed a methodology to measure the functionality and complexity
of engineered systems in order to assess system resilience. While system functions,
functionality, and complexity are widely used concepts in systems engineering, there
is signficant diversity in their definitions and no unified approach to measurement.
This research establishes a method for measuring impacts to functionality in dy-
namic engineered systems based on changes in kinetic energy. This metric is applied
at particular levels of abstraction and system scales, consistent with the established
multiscale nature of systems. By measuring system behavior in context with expected
scenarios, it is possible to estimate expected functionality or set bounds on a system’s
maximum functionality.
Functionality and system effectiveness is heavily influenced by the amount of avail-
able energy and the information a system has about its environment. A framework
is needed for quickly assessing the impact of changes in information in order to drive
system architecture and design. This research relates functionality to the information
content required to describe a system using principles from information theory and
complexity theory.
The theory developed in this research is validated using an aircraft simulation
with 2 degrees of freedom, which is used to generate data against a large number of
scenarios for several system instantiations. Analysis of the results of this simulation
shows consistency with the developed theory and establishes a solid basis for further
exploration and application of this research.
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FUNCTIONALITY, COMPLEXITY, AND APPROACHES TO ASSESSMENT
OF RESILIENCE UNDER CONSTRAINED ENERGY AND INFORMATION
I. Introduction
Over the past century, engineered systems have increased dramatically in what
is known colloquially as “complexity”. Complexity creeps in as desire grows for in-
creased automation or solutions to daunting challenges. Its characteristics appear in
suddenly critical problems of modern civilization that were nonexistent mere years
before. Complexity is intimately tied to system behavior – the performance of func-
tions – although the nature of the relationship appears murky through the lens of our
current systems engineering tools.
Engineers lament the multitude of unforeseen consequences of designing high tech-
nology systems, as solving one technical hurdle leads to the revelation of ten-fold more,
the revealing often taking dramatic form such as an aircraft crash or network failure.
These system collapses usually seem to come with little warning or means of aversion.
Great questions underlie what drives or enables complexity and what factors con-
tribute to the decline or collapse of a complex system. Despite apparent differences
between systems, there are common principles of complexity that can be applied to
most or all complex systems. It is the aim of this research to provide a better under-
standing of how to approach complexity, establish firm linkages between measurement
of complexity and measurement of functionality, determine system design strategies
for resilience in complex systems, and develop methodologies to guide systems engi-
neers.
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1.1 Motivations
Modern tools of civilization, particularly military systems, have become signif-
icantly more complex over time. In prior centuries, the essentials of warfare were
assumed stable and well understood: keep the men and horses healthy, maintain
national support, and apply enduring principles of warfare. The results could be
predicted within a limited range of scenarios.
In today’s world, a vigorous solar storm or well-placed Electromagnetic Pulse
(EMP) can take down the electric grid for months or years, compromising military
acquisition, logistics, or national integrity itself [50]. Anti-Satellite (ASAT) weapons
could cripple the U.S. military’s navigation, targeting, and communication systems.
Geo-political realignment could reduce U.S. oil access by 80%, almost completely elim-
inating the country’s ability to wage conventional war to a much greater degree than
faced even in World War II [32]. In short, critical system dependencies exist where
none did before since modern life and modern warfare have created novel systems
of increased complexity (e.g. the national electrical grid, the internet, the Global
Positioning System, mobile device technology, oil-based infrastructure, mechanized
agriculture, Just-In-Time logistics systems, etc.). These system dependencies exist
on top of the dependencies common with the past such as procuring food supplies.
The immense benefits of these systems are clear; less clear are the non-linear vulner-
abilities that emerge as these complex systems migrate from novelty to normalcy.
The modern world’s adoption of these complex systems has outpaced our capacity
to analyze and prepare for critical vulnerabilities that can lead to cascading collapse,
affecting military systems and beyond. The key motivation for this research is to
develop theory and methodology to assist in designing resilient architectures, thus
providing the best opportunities to avoid adopting systems and strategies that intro-
duce new critical vulnerabilities.
2
1.2 Problem Statement
Designing for resiliency is most effective early in the systems engineering process,
a point where, unfortunately, the least amount of system detail is available or even
considered. As concepts progress from low fidelity to high fidelity, certain design
features become “locked in” and increasingly difficult to change. It is not enough
to develop theory and methodology to assist in complex systems design, it must be
employable easily and early in system design. Therefore a second key motivation is
to adapt the theory and methodology to a quick turn effectiveness analysis capability.
The methods developed in this research must be scalable to all levels of fidelity, from
initial concept description to analysis of fielded systems.
1.3 Research Objectives
The primary goals of this research are to develop a method to measure the func-
tionality and complexity of a system in a practical manner and use that methodology
to assess the resilience of the system. First, it is important to articulate what is meant
by functionality and complexity, as there is significant variance across the literature.
The study of the literature will form a basis for deriving applicable measures and
methodologies. The next objective is to assess the impact of constrained energy and
information in theory. The final objective is to demonstrate the theory with using
simulation to begin validatating the theoretical conclusions.
1.4 Research Questions
It is hypothesized that higher functionality and higher complexity drive increased
system resilience subject to constraints on availability of energy and information. In
proving/disproving this hypothesis, the follow questions need to be answered:
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• How can functionality be measured?
• How can complexity be measured and what is its relationship to functionality?
• What is the effect of reduced energy availability on functionality and complex-
ity?
• What is the effect of reduced information on functionality and complexity?
• How can knowledge of functionality and complexity be applied to the systems
engineering process?
1.5 Method Overview
The overall approach in meeting the research objectives and answering the ques-
tions in the problem statement is described below. Chapter II organizes and analyzes
the existing literature on functionality and complexity, forming the basis for defini-
tions and metrics related to functionality in Chapter III. The functionality metrics
are developed further and used to explore the impact of changes in energy avail-
ability on functionality. (Note: Chapter III is a wholly contained paper submitted
to the International Council on Systems Engineering (INCOSE) Journal of Systems
Engineering [18].)
Chapter IV extends the discussions of functionality and energy to complexity and
information, leveraging insights from information theory and the Law of Requisite
Variety (LRV). This enables a complete theoretical treatment of functionality, com-
plexity and assessing resilience under changes in energy and information. (Note:
Chapter IV is also a complete journal paper which will be submitted to the Institute
of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) IEEE Systems Journal.)
A simulation is described in Chapter V. Simulation results are also found in
Chapter V, which are used to validate the theory. Finally, the theory and analysis
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are used to draw conclusions and make recommendations for future work in Chapter
VI.
1.6 Research Contributions
• This research demonstrated a practical methodology for assessing the function-
ality of dynamic sytems (as a proxy for complexity), which can be used to
compare systems in common scenario sets, measure historical functionality, or
set bounds on the maximum functionality.
• This research established a theoretical basis for guiding the design of systems
that are resilient to conditions of limited energy and information.
• This research coupled several areas of study into one coherent theory, drawing
from complexity theory, information theory, systems theory, systems engineer-
ing, reliability engineering, and systems architecture.
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II. Literature Review
The focus of this research is to develop a practical methodology for assessing the
functionality and complexity of dynamic systems. The development of this methodol-
ogy and supporting theory leverages complexity theory, information theory, systems
theory, systems engineering, reliability engineering, and systems architecture. This
research drew most heavily from the diverse fields of complexity theory and systems
engineering. As this research will demonstrate, the route to practical measurement
of complexity is through functionality.
2.1 Systems and Functionality
2.1.1 Defining Systems.
Before developing the methodology to assess aspects of complex systems, it is
necessary to precisely define what is meant by a “system”. In the systems engineering
community, several popular definitions for the term have emerged in recent years.
The Department of Defense (DoD) defines a system as “A functionally, physically,
and/or behaviorally related group of regularly interacting or interdependent elements;
that group of elements forming a unified whole”. [51] Further, it defines System of
Systems (SoS) as “An SoS is defined as a set or arrangement of systems that results
when independent and useful systems are integrated into a larger system that delivers
unique capabilities”. [51]
System architectets Maier and Rechtin define system as “a set of different ele-
ments so connected or related as to perform a unique function not performable by
the elements alone”. [46] This definition does not explicitly account for scale or en-
vironment. The International Council of Systems Engineering (INCOSE) adopted a
similar definition adopted from Maier and Rechtin:
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“A system is a construct or collection of different elements that together
produce results not obtainable by the elements alone. The elements, or
parts, can include people, hardware, software, facilities, policies, and doc-
uments; that is, all things required to produce systems-level results. The
results include system level qualities, properties, characteristics, functions,
behavior and performance. The value added by the system as a whole, be-
yond that contributed independently by the parts, is primarily created by
the relationship among the parts; that is, how they are interconnected.”
[36]
2.1.1.1 Kuras Definition of System.
An expansive treatment by Kuras worked to establish an improved definition of
a system that captures the multi-scale nature of systems, structural and dynamic
aspects of systems, and accounts for subjective and objective qualities in the human
perception of systems. [43] His basic definition of a system is “a collection of properties
and relationships that is both a whole and a part of a more expansive whole.” [43]
This definition emphasizes the notion of how a system exists at multiple scales and
thus fits with the motivations of the research topic.
Kuras takes his definition much farther and more thoroughly than the straight-
forward version above. Before presenting the expanded definition it is necessary to
define a number of terms.
A conceptualization is a subjective interpretation of reality by an observer. A con-
ceptualization has: a Field of View (FOV), which is a measure of the expanse or in-
clusiveness; a resolution (RES), the degree to which portions of the conceptualization
can be distinguished; and one or more patterns, the content of a conceptualization.
The concept of field-of-view is well-understood in the realm of systems architec-
ture. Changing the observer’s perspective of the system yields new insights. Linked
together, multiple views portray a more complete understanding of the system. [46]
Patterns are a rich topic of discussion, but are in essence a structure (conceptual-
ization) of a system as perceived by an observer. A key point here is that the focus
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(and system scale) can enable the perception of a different pattern of a system. [43]
For illustration, consider the dramatic change in perspective when focusing on one
pattern or the other in depth-perception-based holograms.
A holon (H) is a entity that is both a whole and part of a more expansive whole
(see the simplified Kuras definition for system above), which is used to distinguish
those patterns that refer to a particular system.
Using equation 1, a system ¢, is a collection of parts that is: represented (approx-
imated) by conceptualizations at one or more scales µ through ν; is always concep-
tualized as a holon at each scale at which the system is conceptualized, such as Hµ ;
is always conceptualized at each scale as objects (Ei) and relationships (RELj). Pm
denotes a property and RELn denotes a relationship, where m ∈ M and n ∈ N are
index sets enumerating all properties and relationships in all possible conceptualiza-
tions. H denotes the holon that explicitly distinguishes the parts of the system from
the parts of its environment and that explictly provides the cohesion of its parts as
a whole. The notation in equation 1, per Kuras, indicates the fact that ¢ may be
conceptualized at multiple scales. [43]
¢ ≡ {Pm;RELn}M,N ;H
¢
µ ∈ {Sµ}, Sµ = {Ei;RELj}Iµ,Jµ ;Hµ
...
¢
ν ∈ {Sν}, Sν = {Ei;RELj}Iν ,Jν ;Hν
(1)
For each scale-specific approximation in equation 1, the relevant modalities of
focus, field of view, resolution, and frames of reference are explicitly noted. Sµ de-
notes all time invariant (with respect to frame of reference) parts of the scale-specific
approximation. Simple objects and relationships can be aggregated as compound
objects consistent with reductionism and determinism.
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2.1.2 Defining Functionality.
For the purposes of engineering, the definition of “system” typically includes refer-
ence to performance or function. The definition used by Maier and Rechtin for system
is “a set of different elements so connected or related as to perform a unique func-
tion not performable by the elements alone.” [46] This definition does not explicitly
account for scale or environment. INCOSE adopted a similar definition. [36]
A representative definition for function is “a task, action, or activity that must be
accomplished to achieve a desired outcome or provide a desired capability.” [42] While
accurate, more precision is required before approaching a measureable quantity.
Stryker [63] defines function as “[a] technical process involving energy, material,
and/or signals being converted and or channeled.” The energy, material, or signals
acted upon are defined as flows.
It should be noted that there is an established body of work known as Function
Point Analysis (FPA) which is defined as measuring the business functionality that
an information system provides to a user [38]. However, this field applies exclusively
to software, as opposed to dynamic systems, and it applies only to estimating the
cost, duration, and amount of resources required to develop a software project. This
research seeks to establish and analyze functionality with a systems engineering view,
which is a very different context than the business motivations of FPA.
Stryker defines functionality as “the number of functions to be performed by a
system.” [63] INCOSE defines functionality as “a set of attributes that bear on the
existence of a set of functions and their specified properties”. [35] Buede [11] defines
functionality as “a set of functions that is required to produce a particular output”.
In addition, Simple Functionality is defined as “an ordered [sic] sequence of functional
proceses that operates on a single input to produce a single output.” Also, Complete
Functionality is defined as “a complete set of coordinated processes that operate on
9
all of the necessary inputs for producing a specific output”.
2.2 Fundamentals of Complexity and Complex Adaptive Systems
A complex system is said to exist on the “edge of chaos”, where the system is
neither chaotic nor static. It is not wholly predictable, but it still exhibits patterns
allowing insight. A key distinguishing feature of complex systems versus merely “com-
plicated” systems is the level of reducibility. [48] Complicated systems are composed
of relatively independent parts, but complex systems’ components are dependent on
one another. Maier and Rechtin [46] define complex as “composed of interconnected
or interwoven parts”. Removing a component fundamentally alters the structure of
the system. It is the difference between moving furniture and moving a wall.
2.2.1 Chaos.
A classic example of chaos theory is that a butterfly flapping its wings in Peking
can change the weather in New York a week later. Restated, the predictions of the
weather system can rapidly be rendered useless with but a slight change in initial
conditions.
Climate, however, is the deep structure of the weather system. Precise predictions
are limited by chaotic behavior, but it takes significant stimulus to upset the climate.
Patterns (structure) are formed from feedback within the climate/weather system
and with external systems, such as humans.
In a chaotic system, initially close points will diverge exponentially as the system
operates, thus making the system unpredictable. This chaos can derive from more
than one source: either the system is unpredictable because it is stochastic or the
underlying structure of the system dynamics is non-linear.
In deterministic chaos, the rules of the system are clear and unambiguous. An
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initial point is mapped to another point that requires increased precision. After many
cycles, the result is unpredictable because the necessary precision exceeds our abilities.
As an example, consider the gravitational 3-body problem: it is based on completely
deterministic rules, but after a finite number of iterations, the calculation becomes
unmanageable. The system diverges exponentially as the required precision exceeds
that of whatever computer is used, and small errors come to dominate the dynamics
rather than any initial regular motion. [58]
The purpose for exploring deterministic chaos is to illustrate that we need not in-
voke stochastic processes to produce chaotic (read: unpredictable) behavior. Rather,
it shows that chaos is a deep property of non-linear systems, which are further com-
plicated by the underlying uncertainty of the universe. In a deterministic chaotic
system, a purely random choice of initial point has zero probability of infinite sur-
vival. In a stochastic chaotic system, any initial point has zero probability of infinite
survival.
2.2.2 Flickering indicators, tipping points, and rapid state transitions.
Collapse can be defined as a rapid reduction in complexity, either into chaos or
stasis. The challenge for those studying complex systems is to predict when a collapse
might occur, which might further lead to the ability to control (cause or prevent)
collapse.
Flickering indicators, also known as squealers, are possible predictors of collapse.
There is clear evidence that systems characterized by a bifurcation produce squealers
shortly before rapid state transitions. [57] In a fold bifurcated system, the equilibrium
curve is not linear but “folds back” on itself to produce two separate continuous
functions across an unstable gap. As a system in equilibrium adjusts its equilibrium
state in response to external conditions, a fold bifurcated system will approach a
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critical tipping point – upon reaching it the system state will rapidly transition across
the gap to the other continuous curve.
In such systems, squealers appear as the system slows down in its rate of response
to external stimulus. This change in recovery rate (one squealer) starts far from
the bifurcation point and decreases smoothly as the transition is approached. This
slowing is the result of the eigenvalue for the rate of change of the system state
approaching zero at the bifurcation.
This slowing down phenomenon of fold bifurcated systems yields other interesting
squealers. As a system slows down (approaches the threshold), its autocorrelation
coefficient will increase because each state becomes increasingly like its past state.
The variance also increases because perturbations do not decay. Other potential
squealers are related to spatial patterns. There is also evidence that systems with
bifurcations other than the fold type exhibit similar behavior. [57]
2.2.3 Collapse.
The tipping points and rapid state transitions of the previous section correlate
with what is commonly known as collapse. Intuitively, most people understand what
is meant by the collapse of a system. In discussing the collapse of a civilization, such
as the Western Roman Empire, it is clear that a highly complex society transitioned
to a fractious, less complex one. This understanding motivates anthropologist Joseph
Tainter’s definition of societal collapse as “a rapid reduction in complexity” [65].
United States Air Force (USAF) Lt Col Daniel Marticello used Tainter’s work to
qualitatively demonstrate the trend towards collapse of the US Air Force acquisition
system [47]. As the research explored in this paper in part links Tainter’s work on
complexity to physics-based notions of complexity, it could complement Marticello’s
work with a quantitative approach.
12
As stated, the primary goals of this research are to develop a method to measure
the complexity of a system in a practical manner and use that measure to assess the
stability or resilience of the system. Of primary interest for application is assessing the
resiliency of system architectures in energy-constrained and information-constrained
environments. Such a method could have a wide variety of applications, however,
including anticipating collapse of systems (such as the aforementioned USAF acqui-
sition system).
2.2.4 Complex Adaptive Systems.
Sheard and Mostashari [60], discuss some aspects that describe a complex system.
These include: being composed of many autonomous components (agents); being
self-organizing; displaying emergent macro-level behavior; and adapting to the envi-
ronment (fitness landscape). Each of these aspects will be discussed in further detail
in later sections.
Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS) can be characterized by the following proper-
ties: the system consists of a network of many agents acting in parallel; it has many
levels of organization; it anticipates the future; and it has many niches which can
be exploited by agents adapted for the purpose. [67] All of these properties, which
will be investigated further, serve to produce emergence – a collective property of a
system that cannot be predicted by examining each agent individually.
Important to CAS is the concept of dynamic equilibrium, or homeostasis. CAS
are living systems (usually not just figuratively), with constantly moving processes.
[48] If we consider cell osmosis, there is a point referred to as equilibrium where water
concentration is stable on both sides of the membrane. However, this is dynamic
equilibrium – if it is static equilibrium, there is no fluid exchange and the cell is
therefore dead. This can be extended to all CAS: when we speak of stability, we’re
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speaking of homeostasis – the system is always in motion.
Why is this important? With a dynamic system, something must always occur (or
be occurring) for the system to operate. If that something is interrupted or modified
it can have profound effects on the system’s seemingly stable behavior.
2.2.5 Fractals.
Fractals derive their name from their non-Euclidean nature: instead of being de-
fined by integer dimensions (1-D for a line, 2-D for a square, etc.), fractals must
be described by fractional dimensions. Examples of fractal geometry can be seen
in clouds, coastlines, trees, and many other natural phenomena. Fractals also ex-
hibit self-similarity (see Figure 1), which enables useful mathematical modeling of
these shapes. Fractals tie strongly with the concepts of resolution and field-of-view
discussed earlier regarding the definition of “system” by Kuras [43].
Figure 1 shows a classic fractal known as the Koch curve. For each iteration of
construction, the middle third of each line segment is replaced with two lines of length
1/3 of the original (x=3), which creates 4 line segments from the original one (q=4).
With each successive iteration, the length of the curve approaches infinity. [58]
The length of a curve L(r) is given by the product of the number of line segments
required to cover it times the size of those line segments. For a Euclidean curve, as the
line segments shrink, the product N · r = L(r) approaches a finite limit. However, for
fractals this product diverges, since we encounter ever smaller detail. Instead there is
a critical exponent DH , known as the Hausdorff dimension, for which N · rDH = L(r)
remains finite. In the limit, DH = lim
r→0
logN
log
1
r
.
Looking at a generic fractal generator, the number of pieces N is proportional
to qn, and the nth line segment has length r =
r0
xn
. The equation for the Hausdorff
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Figure 1. Initial iterations for constructing a Koch fractal
dimension becomes DH = lim
n→∞
log qn
log xn − log r0
→ log q
log x
. A Euclidean curve has
DH = 1, a Euclidean area has DH = 2, and so on. [58]
Fractals are important because they describe the deep structure of many complex
systems. Coastlines (and national borders) are fractal shapes. Functions in the brain,
such as sound processing, exhibit a fractal nature. Brownian motion (a stochastic
fractal) describes not only the motion of particles on the surface of water, but the
structure of mountains. Fitting fractals to CAS, such as warfare systems, could yield
useful insight and will be explored in a later section.
2.2.6 Modeling Complex Adaptive Systems.
2.2.6.1 Agent-based techniques.
Although often tied to Complex Adaptive Systems, agent-based models are just
one, albeit powerful, method available for exploring CAS. As discussed above, there
are many useful mathematical tools appropriate for CAS modeling.
Agent-based modeling uses collections of simple (relative to the system under ex-
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amination) autonomous “agents”. Agents can be animals, soldiers, molecules, atoms,
cells, stock brokers, or organizations. We can abstract the definition further to apply
to functions, ideas, or innovations. It should be recognized that any agent, partic-
ularly humans, is made up of many sub-agents: cells, molecules, atoms, sub-atomic
particles, all of which affect each other to produce complex emergent behavior at
various functional levels.
The key to agent-based modeling is establishing an appropriate rule framework.
The ‘edge’ in the edge of chaos is not in phase space but in the space of rules. [48]
An agent is faced with constant decisions on courses of action balanced between
all the rules in its set. One rule-mixing strategy may produce elegant emergent
behavior while another causes uncontrolled divergence, and the results will vary as
the environment changes.
2.2.6.2 Networks.
Network modeling is another approach to managing CAS. Formal treatment of
networks leads to realistic models that are amenable to mathematical analysis. For
example, networks such as the World-Wide Web, metabolic pathways in cells, tele-
phone calls, and sexual contacts approach power-law distributions. [48] Networks in
general are robust against random failures, but targeted failures can have powerful
effects – provided the targeter has a good understanding of the network structure.
Some argue (convincingly) that all agent representations discussed in CAS are
networks – in rule-based agent systems, agents are the nodes and the rules are the
connections; in genetic algorithms, genes are the nodes and they are linked by the
processes of recombination; and even autocatalytic molecule systems have polymer
compounds as agents and catalytic molecules as links. [67]
There are several types of networks, some of which lend themselves more easily to
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analysis. Some of these main types include Small-world, Loop, and Pack networks.
In a Small-world network, each node is initially connected to a set of neighbors.
Those connections are then randomly severed and new connections to random nodes
are established. This leads to a “6 degrees of separation” model where there are
trivially few connecting nodes between any two given ones. [48]
In a Loop network, agents live on a circle and are connected to their nearest neigh-
bors in either direction. Agents look to their nearest neighbors in deciding actions.
In such a network, behaviors propagate from neighbor to neighbor, which simplifies
analysis. When this simple structure is extended into two dimensions (imagine a
continuous checkerboard – the top and bottom ends are brought together, then the
left and right), the resultant torus topography is known as a Grid network.
In a Pack network, each node on a loop network is replaced with a collection of
agents. Each of these agents is connected, and each agent is linked with one other
agent, usually in the corresponding location in the next pack.
An N-Loop network consists of N loop networks where each agent has additional
connections to agents on other loops. An example of this representation is an agents
family, friends, online contacts, and schoolmates networks.
These different network structures produce very different results for agent be-
havior. When applied to segregation models (mixing of different agent types), Pack
networks produce the highest levels of segregation and Grid networks the least. Defin-
ing conformity as the percentage of agents choosing one of two possible actions, Pack
networks also produce the highest conformity and Loop networks the lowest. The
power of using these structures is that these claims can be proved mathematically,
inviting more rigor into CAS analysis and development.
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2.2.6.3 Communication and cooperation.
Inputs that agents receive often come not just from the surrounding environment,
but also other agents. This invites opportunity for agents to manipulate some aspects
of other agents’ behavior. [48]
The Prisoners Dilemma is a classic illustration of game theory and strategic coop-
eration. In the scenario, two prisoners are faced with the decision to cooperate with
their isolated co-conspirator or defect and sell out their partner to the authorities.
Payoff is determined according to the matrix A =
(
R S
T P
)
where T > R > P > S.
Thus, if both prisoners cooperate, they receive a medium reward value. If both de-
fect, they receive a small reward. If only one defects, the defector is richly rewarded
and the cooperator receives little or no reward. A single play of the game yields
the solution that the optimum course of action is to defect. Thus, through strict
logic (via Nash Bargaining) [49], both agents have selected the least desirable sce-
nario. This is also true by extension to N agents, with total rewards calculated as
RC =
R ·NC + S · (N −NC)
N
, RD =
T ·NC + P · (N −NC)
N
, where NC is the num-
ber of cooperating agents, RC is the reward for cooperators and RD is the reward for
defectors. The value for RD is always greater than for RC . [28]
Developing a strategy for multiple rounds, however, is much more complex. Given
an appropriate rule set, agents now have a history, a memory, and a running tally of
reward. In the first set of tests by Miller and Page [48], agents were pitted against
one another in a series of games, then allowed to adapt their strategies (via genetic
algorithm [31]). Some correlation between high variability in potential payoff and high
strategic complexity was found (producing more dynamic adaptation), but defection
was still the dominant strategy.
The results are intriguing, but are missing a key component of (non-isolated) in-
telligent agents in the real world: communication. In further tests of game-playing
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agents, Miller and Page [48] introduced a framework with which agents could com-
municate. Starting with a set of known communication tokens, none of which are
preassigned any special meaning, agents exchange and receive a set of tokens prior to
each play of the game.
This framework gave rise to very dynamic emergent behavior observed by Miller
and Page. The ability to communicate gave rise to strong bursts of cooperation,
followed by the emergence of mimics, and long periods of mutual defection. [48]
Because the agents adapt and improvise (via the genetic algorithm rules), the system
exhibits periodic stochastic escape from the mutual defection attractor. Such behavior
shows the importance of information flow on system dynamics.
2.2.6.4 Organizations and hierarchy.
Organizations exist to solve problems more effectively than an individual agent. It
can be proven that a deterministic organization can be developed to perfectly solve one
deterministic problem. [48] However, given the full set of problems, any organizational
structure will be equally accurate in producing a solution. It is therefore demonstrated
that organizations that dont tailor their structure to the problem at hand are no more
competitive than any other. In addition, an organization attempting to span multiple
problems must make decisions on acceptable levels of solution quality (fitness), since
it is not possible for one organization to perfectly solve more than one.
Of course, no organization exists in isolation. Every hierarchy fits within other
higher-level, overlapping, or reshuffled hierarchies. In addition, organizations are
in constant competition both with external hierarchies and internal forces. For an
organization to survive in an evolutionary environment it must constantly adapt its
structure to solve multiple problems and compete with opponents, all while ensuring
its structure aligns with the overall hierarchy. Exploring organizational rules appears
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a rich area for research, and would be of particular interest to military commanders.
2.2.6.5 Warfare agents.
Using agent-based modeling can give us clues to what types of tools we should
take into battle and in what ways to employ them across a range of adversaries with
differing capabilities or resources.
Military doctrine increasingly recognizes the opponent as a living and adapting
warfighting system. Old sciences used for developing strategies are unable to keep up
with these advanced principles of doctrine because they fail to model the truly impor-
tant part of warfare – the complex interactions. Principles such as maneuver warfare,
Warden’s Five Rings systems approach, and strategic effects require something more.
That something more is found in agent-based models. Individual soldiers can be
modeled with simple rules and the resultant large scale dynamics can be simulated
repeatedly. Differences in training, skills, resources, and strategy can all be encoded
and tested.
Advanced warfare models such as the Hierarchical Interactive Theater Model
(HITM) and the Irreducible Semi-Autonomous Adaptive Combat (ISAAC) model
have demonstrated effectiveness in accurately modeling warfare scenarios, and have
proved extremely adaptive to changes in the simulation environment. [12] HITM, for
instance, illustrates the importance of rapid maneuver particularly when faced with
resource constraints.
2.2.6.6 Fitness landscapes.
Every agent operates within an environment. This environment is made up of
topological features in addition to other agents operating at multiple functional levels.
It is within this environment that an agent must seek to thrive to achieve maximum
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fitness. This environment can therefore be described as a fitness landscape.
The environment of a complex system is often of greater complexity than the
system itself. The environment also constantly changes, due to influences internal and
external to the system. [60] As each agent develops, it changes the fitness landscape
of all other agents in the local network.
A fitness limit can be defined as a driving stress on a population that upsets the
balance between uniformity and variety in either direction, thus leading to extinc-
tion. [23] In warfare modeling, a fitness limit is characterized by an either paralyzed
or fragmented force; the opponent (in combination with the fitness landscape, or en-
vironment) drives the force to failure (extinction). There are multiple philosophies
from military theorists on how a force might accomplish this, but one of the most
relevant and powerful for agent-based techniques is found in the simplicity of Boyd’s
OODA Loop (discussed in the next section).
In engineered systems, it is usually an open question as to the appropriate deter-
minant of the fitness values as it is very easy to introduce designer bias. In warfare
systems, it seems most appropriate that fitness measurements should be based on the
commander’s intent.
2.2.7 OODA Loops.
One increasingly popular theory of warfare is based upon the little-published work
of USAF Col John Boyd [19]. At the heart of the theory is the idea of continual
loops which follow the process of Observe-Orient-Decide-Act (OODA), with multiple
feedback points and internal complexities [10].
Boyds visual depiction of the OODA is shown in Figure 2 [10]. Notice that it is
not one single loop, but multiple processes of internal adjustment and correlation.
Many models assume that agents perform all elements of the OODA cycle simulta-
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Figure 2. Boyd’s OODA Loop sketch.
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neously. This approach removes key timing behavior from the model which in the real
world is crucial to any complex activity. In practice, there is coordination of OODA
loops, which should be the principle focus for the designer or military commander.
The HITM (discussed earlier) encodes OODA loops within each soldier agent, and
the effects of varying OODA loop coordination can be seen. [12]
2.2.7.1 Fractals in time.
OODA loops are present at all levels of an organization. This begs the question,
what organizational structure will yield the fastest OODA cycle? Gustavsson and
Planstedt discuss the concept of fractal OODAs. [29] Recall that for geometrical
shapes, N · rDH = L(r) [58]. The equivalent representation for time is N · tDH = L(t),
where t is a segment of time. For an ordered fractal, each subprocess must be x
times faster than the next-higher level process, or for the nth cycle t =
t0
xn
. Similarly,
the number of cycles N is proportional to qn. This leads to the identical result for
physical space, DH =
log q
log x
.
One interesting (if obvious) result is that by increasing the number of subprocesses
one can compensate for a slower OODA loop time while holding DH constant. This
makes sense as having more agents allows you to gather more information and execute
actions faster. But there must be an upper limit where internal complexity negatively
impacts the system, and this is where Complex Adaptive Systems approaches come
into play.
2.2.8 Complex Adaptive Systems Engineering.
Systems Engineering of complex systems must be considered more as designing the
engineering and management mechanisms than a holistic detailed design of a system
(which is precisely the approach of Systems Architecture). The principles of CAS
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force a focus on the interactions between systems and how those interactions drive
adaptation, truly evolutionary design. Since we cannot predict with certainty how
a complex system will evolve, we cannot afford to attempt to design with certainty.
Such an effort leads to false impressions of precision and non-adaptable systems.
A counter-intuitive concept from Systems Architecture is the hourglass model:
forcing system standardization at a targeted inflection point enables increased adapt-
ability and divergence of innovation. The clearest example of this is the Internet
Protocol (IP), which allows a diversity of hardware and link technologies on one side
and diverse applications on the other. [23] The implications from this are intrigu-
ing: levying a hard constraint on a very specific point of the system drives increased
emergence. This is a key clue to unraveling the mystery of how to influence adaptive
systems, that one must grasp the deep structure of the problem to identify the critical
points. (The parallel here with the language of maneuver warfare is not trivial; driv-
ing emergent warfare behavior hinges on understanding both opposing and friendly
force structure, and using the knowledge to apply pressure at the point of greatest
effect.) No model can fully describe the system under consideration; there is always
a mismatch between models and reality. [9] It is the constant job of the researcher,
analyst, or strategist to reduce this mismatch by creating new models as the old ones
lose their usefulness.
2.3 Thermodynamic Entropy
In order to fully explore approaches to measuring complexity, it is necessary to
review the concept of thermodynamic entropy. Boltzmann defined entropy for a
perfect gas changing states isothermally according to equation 2, where N is the
thermodynamic entropy, k is the Boltzman constant, T is the temperature, Eψ is the
Gibbs energy, h is the total heat of the system, and X is the set of possible system
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states. [56]
H = −k
∫
X
(Eψ−h)
kT
exp(
(Eψ−h)
kT
)dx (2)
As the quantities of molecules involved in such a system become large, this de-
terministic expression is replaced with a probabilistic one. The probability of the
system being in state x is defined according to equation 3. This definition yields the
simplified expression for entropy in Equation 4. [56]
p(x) ≡ exp( (Eψ−h)
kT
) (3)
H = −k
∫
X
p(x)ln(p(x))dx (4)
Entropy may be further generalized to apply to any physical system. Thus, it
can be seen that entropy is related to the state space of a system and the probability
distribution of that state space. Entropy is a statistical measure based on a mechanical
process. The second law, which states that entropy for closed systems must increase or
remain constant over time, is a statistical law. That is, there exists a finite probability
that a system will spontaneously reduce its entropy, but over a long time horizon (t
→∞) the probability of such an event approaches zero.
Kittel [41] lists several basic processes that increase entropy in a closed system,
which is analogous to increasing the size of the system’s state space.
2.4 Measuring Complexity
A difficulty in complexity theory is the lack of a clear definition for complexity,
particularly one that is measurable. In many cases throughout the literature, it seems
the authors are speaking of different or even mutually exclusive phenomena. The most
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apt summary of the issue is the tongue-in-cheek assertion by complexity researcher
Seth Lloyd: “I can’t define it for you, but I know it when I see it.” [20]
A root cause in the lack of unified complexity definitions is that there are in fact
several types of complexity. The first formal treatment of complexity focused on algo-
rithmic complexity, which reflects the computation requirements for a mathematical
process. [20] Senge and Sterman include also dynamic complexity, which is primarily
characterized by difficult-to-discern cause-effect relations. [59] [62]
One of the most workable definitions is that of thermodynamic depth, which actu-
ally seems to unify the two complexity camps. Thermodynamic depth as complexity
asserts that complexity is a “measure of how hard it is to put something together”.
[45] [22] There are several variations on this approach, with the commonality that
complexity disappears for both ordered and purely random systems. [44] [20]
Bar-Yam defines the complexity of a physical system as the length of the shortest
string, s, that can represent its properties. This can be the result of measurements
and observations over time. [5]
An energy-based metric is proposed by Chaisson. By measuring the energy rate
density in equation 5, where Φm is the energy rate density, E is energy flow through
a system, τ is the time epoch, and m is system mass, Chaisson obtains results that
correlate well with other notions of complexity. [13]
Φm =
E
τm
(5)
However, the energy rate density metric has some drawbacks. By normalizing
with respect to mass, this metric produces incorrect results for complexity when
comparing some systems. For example, suppose an electronic brain is built to mimic
the operation of a human brain. The human brain may process energy at the same
rate as a theoretical electronic brain, but due to differences in basic materials (i.e.
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the weight of neurons vs. semi-conductors), the two systems, which most theorists
would recognize as identically complex, could have vastly different Φm values. Thus,
by normalizing with respect to mass instead of function, the Φm metric produces
incorrect results for the relative complexity of systems.
A practical difficulty in using the Φm metric is determining the appropriate mass
and energy to use. In measuring the Φm of a civilization, Chaisson uses the mass
of humanity and the total energy processed by the civilization. However, the total
energy of a civilization does not flow through only its humans, but also its machinery,
beasts of burden, vehicles, etc., the mass of which is a difficult quantity to measure.
2.5 Energy Scarcity
As discussed in Chapter I, there is significant risk to modern combat systems
under the scenario that friendly energy resources become severely restricted. This
could be due to budget economics, geological constraints on fossil fuel production, or
foreign suppliers collaborating to withhold energy sources.
While the energy landscape for national, international, and military interests is
complex and varied, for operations that are directly relevant to warfare there is one
clearly dominant energy source – oil. The problem could be greatly simplified by
focusing on this one energy source without losing great accuracy of the results. These
direct (first-order) activities include logistic transport within the nation’s borders,
transportation to the Area of Responsibility (AOR), transportation within the AOR,
power for field equipment, and power for Forward Operating Bases (FOB). (Secondary
levels of warfare support could have implications for national level policy and invite
additional analysis; these include energy supplies for manufacturing, force readiness,
deployment/business travel, and so forth.) [32]
Oil yields power through its energy density. The brute force approach is to use this
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fact to overpower systems, where there is little need for energy adaptability provided
there is a relatively unconstrained oil supply. But being forced to use less oil or an
energy system with lower energy density eliminates brute force as an option. Instead,
it drives the system to seek ways to adapt and respond rapidly to an opponent, to
flow around their brute force systems and strike vulnerable locations.
Providing a fitness landscape consisting of energy sources, blue and red forces, ge-
ologic features, and other relevant data could enable an agent-based system to explore
new niches for an energy-flexible force. A competitive and adaptable warfare system
makes use of previously inaccessible and hidden areas of the fitness landscape. A UAS
with the ability to sense thermals and soar has captured an energy niche inaccessible
to an F-22. A methodology to rapidly identify resilient system architectures from a
wide pool of candidates against a diverse environment can assess the utility of using
such niches.
2.6 Information
The DoD has put significant emphasis on Intelligence, Surveillance, and Recon-
naissance (ISR) systems dedicated to the collection and processing of information.
Complexity Theory recognizes strong relationships between information and com-
plexity, but open questions remain: Does information drive or enable complexity?
What role do changes in information processes have in system collapse? How can
information overload be managed?
Information overload in particular is a key concern for the military [40] [53], re-
sulting in billions of lost dollars and lost capability.
Whereas establishing a link between complexity and physical processes required
reference to thermodynamic entropy, understanding complexity’s link with informa-
tion requires a detailed treatment of information entropy and principles of information
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theory. We must also consider what type of information is of concern.
Per Gray [27], in information theory, a dynamical system (Ω, B, P , Z) is mea-
sured using a finite alphabet mapping, f : Ω → A, where Ω is a measurable event
space, B is a particular collection of subsets of Ω, P is a probability measure, Z is a
transformation of the event space such that Z : Ω → Ω (such as time), and A is an
alphabet. It should be noted that an alphabet is not limited to something akin to
our familiar A through Z; a set as vast as the complete set of words in the English
language can constitute an alphabet in this treatment.
The entropy of a random variable, a, from that alphabet may be defined according
to equation 6, where pf is the Probability Mass Function (PMF) of f . [27] This ex-
pression is clearly analogous to thermodynamic entropy (equation 4) . The difference
is the thermodynamic states, Ω, have been mapped to a set of information states, A.
H(f) = −
∑
a∈A
pf (a) ln(pf (a)) (6)
Just as thermodynamic entropy is regarded as a measure of the uncertainty of the
state of a system, information entropy is considered a measure of the uncertainty of
the information about the state of a system. Using this understanding of the nature
of information uncertainty, it is possible to understand the links between complexity
and information. Bar-Yam defines complexity of a system as the length of the shortest
information string s that can completely represent the properties of that system. This
complexity value is equivalent to the information content of a system. [5]
2.6.1 The Law of Requisite Variety.
Ashby’s Law of Requisite Variety (LRV) defines variety as the number of elements
(or states) in a set that can be distinguished. [3] As an example, the set {b r b a b r}
has a variety of 3 letters. Variety can refer to specific events, scenarios, or actions. In
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order for a regulator R to control a set of disturbances D to yield a specific favorable
outcome from set E (the set of all desired outcomes) it must have at least as many
possible responses as there are disturbances. [3] If the same response was applied to
two different disturbances, there would be two different values in the outcome set,
E (a specific outcome is determined by both the disturbance and response). This
is uncontrolled regulation, since there is no control over which specific outcome is
reached; it is controlled only by the disturbance itself. It should be noted that having
such a degree of variety does not necessarily say whether that regulator’s reponses
successfully counter every disturbance to yield an outcome in E, though it is more
likely to do so.
In order to guarantee a favorable outcome, over a given epoch a system must (as
a minimum requirement) have greater than or equal to the amount of variety of its
environment, or Vsystem ≥ Venvironment. [3]
For the systems engineer, says Boardman, this may be interpreted as “for a system
to survive in its environment the variety of choice that the system is able to make
must equal or exceed the variety of influences that the environment can impose on
the system.” [8] In an environment of infinite possibilities, this implies that a system
must have an infinite variety of choices in order to ensure success. It is obviously not
feasible to design a system with infinite degrees of freedom, but it is possible to create
systems that may succeed in an infinite environment for a finite period of time. Life
itself is the clearest example. However, per the Law of Requisite Variety, a favorable
outcome can not be guaranteed, but the more variety the more likely a system is to
survive.
The concept of variety enables a smooth transition between multiple concepts,
including entropy, complexity, and functionality. Entropy can be considered as a
probabilistic measure of variety, and if every state is equiprobable, entropy reduces
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to variety exactly. [30]
If entropy, H, expresses the uncertainty about a system’s state, then if the state
of a system is known exactly, H = 0 (state probability = 1). Using this approach,
the LRV may be formulated in terms of entropy, as Ashby demonstrated in Equation
7. In this equation, E is the set of essential (desired) system states, D is the set of
environmental disturbances, R is the set of system responses, and K is a buffering
term (reflecting dissipative factors in the total system). [30]
H(E) ≥ H(D)−H(R)−K (7)
To visualize each of the terms, recall that entropy is essentially a measure of
the number of possible states for a system; therefore, H(R) is a reflection of the
number of possible states for the regulator. As Heylighen emphasises [30], however,
the formulation in Equation 7 includes the assumption that the system will always
perfectly select the best response to counter any particular disturbance. Allowing for
imperfect selection yields a revised relation of equation 8. [30]
H(E) ≥ H(D) +H(R|D)−H(R)−K (8)
The conditional entropy termH(R|D) represents the uncertainty that the response
set can match the disturbance set. It is calculated as usual for entropy, but the
conditional probabilities are used. If response r is one response in set R (r ∈ R) and
disturbance d is a disturbance in set D (d ∈ D), then the conditional entropy for each
disturbance is found using Equation 9. H(R|D) is calculating by summing over the
full set of D [30].
H(R|d) = −
∑
r∈R
pf (r|d) ln(pf (r|d)) (9)
31
2.7 Summary
The literature review demonstrates that a wide variety of research areas bear
upon this topic. The next two chapters will shape this research material into new
examinations of functionality, complexity, and how they may be measured.
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III. Functionality
Clark, Jason B., David R. Jacques, John M. Colombi, and William P. Baker.
“Assessing system functionality using an energy-based approach”. Journal of Systems
Engineering (submitted article), 2015.
3.1 Introduction
Systems engineering is a study of trade-offs. It is trading high value for low cost;
seeking high efficiency while possessing high flexibility; trying to appear unfathomable
to unfriendly systems while transparent to cooperative ones; or attempting to attain
complete situational awareness without paralysis by information overload.
Those trade-offs are generally characterized as trade-offs in functionality. However,
despite its widespread usage, there does not appear to be a unified approach to the
measurement of functionality. There is common agreement that a loss of functionality
is “bad” and more functionality is “good”, yet precise quantification of more or less
functionality remains elusive. (The caveat to the argument of more functionality being
good is that it is only good if the cost and schedule impacts are properly balanced.)
It is the aim of this paper to provide a method to practically assess the function-
ality of systems, or changes to systems’ functionality, in order to design more capable
and resilient architectures.
3.2 Definition of Systems
An expansive treatment by Kuras defined a system as “a collection of properties
and relationships that is both a whole and a part of a more expansive whole.” [43] This
definition emphasizes the notion of how a system exists at multiple scales (as discussed
below) and thus fits with the motivations of the research topic. There are some recent
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attempts at redefinition of “system” to account for difficulty of engineering complex
systems with multiple layers of interacting systems.
For the purposes of engineering, the definition of “system” typically includes refer-
ence to performance or function. The definition used by Maier and Rechtin for system
is “a set of different elements so connected or related as to perform a unique func-
tion not performable by the elements alone.” [46] This definition does not explicitly
account for scale or environment. The International Council of Systems Engineering
(INCOSE) adopted a similar definition. [36]
Both definitions are “correct”, and both are necessary to develop the definition
for dynamic systems used for this paper. This paper adopts the Kuras definition for
system.
Definition 1 A System is a collection of properties and relationships that exists as
both a whole and a part of a more expansive whole.
Definition 2 A Dynamic System is a collection of properties and relationships which
is capable of changing itself or the environment within which it exists in a manner
not performable by the elements alone.
The requirement for functionality in the definition of system drives treatment
of only dynamic systems, which is the type of concern to engineering, rather than
including some more abstract concepts.
3.3 Definition of Functionality
As mentioned earlier, there does not appear to be a unified approach to the mea-
surement of functionality. A representative definition for function is “a task, action,
or activity that must be accomplished to achieve a desired outcome or provide a de-
sired capability.” [42] While accurate, more precision is required before approaching
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a measureable quantity.
Stryker [63] defines function as “[a] technical process involving energy, material,
and/or signals being converted and or channeled.” The energy, material, or signals
acted upon are defined as flows. This definition is used as the basis for the definition
of function used in this paper:
Definition 3 A Function is a technical process involving flows within a system that
modifies the state vector (including quantity, direction, type, amplitude, frequency, or
phase) of a system.
Mathematically, a function, fi, is a technical process within a system S that
modifies a subset of the state vectors Xi ⊂ XS. That is, fi ∈ FS such that fi : α ⊂
XS → β ⊂ XS where α is a subset of the state vectors XS achievable by S called the
domain of fi, and β is called the range of fi.
A state vector refers to the state space representation, or mathematical model,
of a physical system. The state (or state vector) of a system at a particular time
is the information that, together with an input set, determines the output set. [14]
The state vector includes all attributes of the system, such as degrees of freedom,
constraints, system status (e.g. failure modes), and logical structure.
As stated earlier, flows could include energy, material, or signals, although this
paper will focus primarily on changes in energy. Note that any process that modifies
a state vector as defined will involve some change in the kinetic energy vector for the
flow.
We note there is always the function f0 ∈ FS (not necessarily unique) which has
the property that for every x ∈ XS, f0(x) = x. This function will be called the
“identity function”. In other words, it is always possible to define a function that
maps a system state back onto itself. Further, we can define the composition of
functions on XS, denoted ◦, as fj ◦ fi : α ⊂ XS → γ ⊂ XS and fj ◦ fi ∈ FS.
35
With a precise measurable definition for function, it is now possible to proceed to
defining functionality. It should be noted that there is an established body of work
known as “Function Point Analysis”, which is defined as measuring the business
functionality that an information system provides to a user[38]. However, this field
applies exclusively to software, as opposed to dynamic systems, and it applies only to
estimating the cost, duration, and amount of resources required to develop a software
project. This research seeks to establish and analyze functionality with a systems
engineering view, which is a very different context than the business motivations of
Function Point Analysis.
Stryker defines functionality as “the number of functions to be performed by a
system.” [63] The International Council on Systems Engineering (INCOSE) defines
functionality as “a set of attributes that bear on the existence of a set of functions
and their specified properties”. [35] While these definitions are agreeable, this paper
effectively combines these definitions into one which does not tie functionality to
measurement of functions, which can be arbitrarily partitioned.
Buede [11] defines functionality as “a set of functions that is required to produce
a particular output”. In addition, Simple Functionality is defined as “an ordered [sic]
sequence of functional proceses that operates on a single input to produce a single
output. Also, Complete Functionality is defined as “a complete set of coordinated
processes that operate on all of the necessary inputs for producing a specific output”.
Definition 4 Functionality is the ability of a system, through use of functions, to
affect its degrees of freedom.
Mathematically, for α and β ⊂ XS, functionality, Fα,β, is the minimal set of all
distinct functions f ∈ FS such that f(α) = β. It should be noted that there may be
multiple paths (multiple distinct functions, f) to move from one state to another.
Degrees of freedom refers to the number of generalized coordinates that define a
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system’s allowable motion in configuration space. The concept is distinct from the
state vector in that degrees of freedom are dictated by the dimension of the embedding
phase space for the system. The degrees of freedom for a system may be constrained
below the state dimension for a given system.
To illustrate the idea of functionality as defined, if a surveillance aircraft loses
its ability to elevate its camera turret, it has lost both functionality (the ability to
affect its internal states related to elevating the camera) and a degree of freedom
(a parameter describing the turret angle). Additionally, some functions and degrees
of freedom are only available with certain state values. For example, an aircraft is
unable to rise vertically unless state variables such as speed, aerodynamic surface
positions, and other variables are within certain value ranges.
There may be ordered pairs (α, β) ∈ XS×XS for which Fα,β is empty; this means
the system can not transition from state α to state β. In other words, a system may
not possess the functionality to reach all states in the system. However, if the system
is acted upon by the environment, that functionality could be made to exist.
This definition for functionality allows a range of options for its measurement.
This paper will take the approach of measuring the energy flows of a system, which
will be developed in a subsequent section.
3.4 Systems and Functionality
As mentioned, a system exists at multiple scales. This paper will adopt (with
small clarifications) the definition of system scale by Kuras [43]:
Definition 5 The System Scale is a conceptualization (characterized by the infor-
mation content) of a system due to a particular focus. This focus is realized through
either a combination of a particular field-of-view and resolution of observation or a
particular pattern.
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The concept of field-of-view is well-understood in the field of systems architec-
ture. Changing the observer’s perspective of the system yields new insights. Linked
together, multiple views portray a more complete understanding of the system. [46]
Patterns are a rich topic of discussion, but are in essence a structure (conceptual-
ization) of a system as perceived by an observer. A key point here is that the focus
(and system scale) can enable the perception of a different pattern of a system. [43]
For illustration, consider the dramatic change in perspective when focusing on one
pattern or the other in depth-perception-based holograms.
These concepts lead to one of the fundamental concepts in the functionality metric
developed in this paper, that of a functional level.
Definition 6 A Functional Level is the system scale above which a particular func-
tionality is realized.
Referring back to the definition of functionality, this can also be read as “the
system scale above which a system’s ability to affect particular degrees of freedom
is realized.” The concept of Functional Levels is illustrated in Fig. 3 (adapted from
Sheard and Mostashari [60]), where the functionality of a system can be decomposed
into progressively finer scales. Note that the functionality of interest may include a
particular degree of freedom or a set of them. Specifying a particular functional level
allows a consistency of detail across systems, allowing comparative analysis.
An example assignment of types of functional levels is shown in Table 1. In this
instance, Missions, Mission Tasks, and Functions might be assigned to Levels 1, 2, and
3, respectively. For an Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), a typical mission might
be to support humanitarian operations. To help perform that mission a UAS would
need to conduct surveillance of an area of interest in order to monitor for threats,
in addition to other tasks such as selecting landing zones. To support the task of
surveillance, a UAS would need to first locate a threat, then characterize, identify,
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Figure 3. Functional Levels for a notional system viewed at multiple scales
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Table 1. Examples of Functional Levels
Functional Level Common Types UAS Example
L1 Mission Support Humanitarian Operations
L2 Mission Tasks Conduct Area Surveillance
L3 Functions Locate Threat
geo-locate, and track the target (if mobile).
3.5 Measuring Functionality
The preceding discussions set the stage for establishing a metric of functionality
for dynamic systems. Dynamic systems, by definition, yield changes in their kinetic
energy over time. Using this fact, we can define a Functional Interaction:
Definition 7 A Functional Interaction is an instance where, for a discrete element of
a system, its kinetic energy in the direction of a particular degree of freedom transitions
from a non-zero value to a zero value, or from a zero to a non-zero value.
For a mechanical system, kinetic energy is represented as: KEd =
1
2
m|~v· ~d|2 where
KEd is kinetic energy in the ~d direction, m is the system mass, and ~v is the velocity
vector. A functional interaction occurs when that value reaches zero or becomes
greater than zero. For a car travelling along a road, a functional interaction occurs
when the car stops, starts again, or turns.
One additional definition is required, that of scenario.
Definition 8 A Scenario is a unique set of system conditions to include inputs, con-
straints, initial state, and events.
The preceding discussion allows for the following definition of Realized Function-
ality over an epoch, an arbitrary unit of time used to measure an event:
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Definition 9 Realized Functionality (F) of a system is the number of functional
interactions for a given scenario within a particular epoch and above a particular
functional level.
This is, in essence, functionality by demonstration. A static system may have
potential for functionality, but its functionality cannot be measured until it is active.
Depending on the scenario, a system may respond with differing amounts of function-
ality. A plane flying through clear skies may stay straight and level, but be required
to make complex maneuvers when flying through a storm.
Realized Functionality aligns with Buede’s Simple Functionality discussed earlier.
As he describes, Simple Functionality may not include all of the necessary functional
processes needed to produce the output under all scenarios, nor does it trace the only
possible sequence of those processes. [11] Similarly, Realized Functionality focuses on
a specific scenario. It differs from Simple Functionaliy in that Realized Functionality
does not focus on the inputs, but rather the flow of functions (or interactions) through
a system.
A key to the utility of this definition is the ease with which it may be applied. For
instance, if we choose an appropriate epoch, an aircraft’s ability to fly is dependent
upon exercising a finite number of functional interactions. That is, it must ensure a
constant flow of energy throughout various systems, and perform work using that en-
ergy, in order to survive. Aero surfaces must move, engine components must operate,
and multiple other subsystems must be conducting functional interactions. If the re-
alized functionality is reduced, it means that part of the aircraft system is processing
less energy. If functionality at a certain level of abstraction is reduced, the system
is either reduced in function by mission (e.g. steady level flight) or by damage (e.g.
inoperable engine, aero surfaces).
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Note that system failures may appear to violate the above assertion with respect
to processing energy. In the case of an engine fire, the system may appear to be
processing energy at a higher rate while functionality is reduced (less useful thrust
is produced). However, in failures such as these a functional or destructive limit has
been reached, a concept which will be addressed in a later section.
Important to this definition is “functional level”. For instance, a human’s func-
tionality may be measured at the cellular, molecular, or atomic levels, and given the
same epoch size, the F value increases for each progressively finer system scale.
There are other ways we can illustrate the functionality of systems. For example, a
single-path system can have the same F value as a multi-path network (Fig. 20). The
main difference between these systems is the path for the first system is predictable,
whereas the network path is dependent on additional factors whose properties must
be known to make predictions. It is the difference between the maximum realizable
functionality and the expected functionality of the two systems.
Figure 4. Two systems with identical realized functionality. (a) Single-path (b) Multi-
path Network
Definition 10 Maximum Functionality, FM(σ, L, τ,Ψ), is the the maximum realiz-
able functionality for a system (σ) at a functional level L over an epoch τ , for any
given scenario Si over the range of all possible scenarios Ψ, as in Equation 10.
FM(σ, L, τ,Ψ) = sup(F(σ, L, τ,Ψ)|Si), Si ∈ Ψ (10)
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Realized functionality may be used to measure maximum functionality. If it was
possible to observe a system’s response to all possible scenarios and measure the func-
tionality, this information could be used to construct a description of the maximum
functionaltiy of the system. As the certainty of a system’s structure and functional-
ity decrease, the certainty in (and ability to measure) maximum functionality is also
reduced.
Realized functionality, as defined earlier, is a single observation of system re-
sponding to a particular scenario. Expected Functionality for a system σ may thus be
written as Equation 13 where F is the Cumulative Density Function (CDF) of Ψ.
FX(σ, L, τ,Ψ) ≡ E[F(σ, L, τ,Ψ)] =
∫
Ψ
F(σ, L, τ, Si)dF (Si) ≥ 0 (11)
For a set of finite, discrete, and independent scenarios, expected functionality for a
system σ may be written as Equation 14 where p(Si) is the probability mass function
over Ψ.
FX(σ, L, τ,Ψ) =
∑
Ψ
F(σ, L, τ, Si)p(Si) ≥ 0 (12)
For a given system, one scenario may cause it to respond with a particular behav-
ior, whereas another may produce a completely different behavior. As defined here,
scenarios which produce identical behavior in the system(s) under study are consid-
ered identical (they cannot be differentiated even though they can be distinguished).
This enables a framework for system study where the infinite possibilities of system
scenarios may be parsed to a workable, finite set. For most systems of interest, this
finite set may still be too large for practical analysis, but the solution to this problem
will be addressed subsequently.
Just as Realized Functionality aligns with Buede’s Simple Functionality, Expected
Functionality aligns with his Complete Functionality. Both definitions encompass a
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complete description of system’s functionality across all scenarios. As with Realized
and Simple Functionality, Expected and Complete Functionality differ in that Ex-
pected Functionality focuses on expected functional flow through the system rather
than inputs and outputs.
3.5.1 Agents and Functionality.
Agent-based models are illustrative of many concepts in complex systems, and
measures of functionality should reflect increasing functionality with increasing ac-
tivity of agents.
“Boids” (Bird-androids) are a type of agent based model using rule sets based on
the motions of animal flocks, herds, and swarms. [15] Compare a 3-Boid flock against
3 equivalent non-interacting aircraft. In going from point A to point B, which takes
place over a particular epoch in both cases, non-interacting aircraft will make flight
path adjustments due to atmospheric disturbances. A Boid-aircraft will make these
adjustments as well, but also make adjustments due to each of the Boid guidance rules
due to aircraft position/velocity co-dependencies. At first glance, it might appear that
the Boid flock has higher functionality than the set of non-interacting aircraft.
Since non-cooperative flight is a subset of cooperative flight (equivalent to setting
certain rule weightings to zero), if no Boid rules are invoked, both systems have
equivalent functionality. However, a Boid rule might lead to behavior requiring fewer
flight corrections by, for example, causing all aircraft to align quickly and reduce the
need for evasive maneuvers. Thus, predictions of the functionality of agent-based
systems can not be made for any particular rule-set. The functionality is highly
dependent on the vehicle states and capabilities, as well as the environment. Making
specific predictions of functionality based on a rule set is a difficult proposition.
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3.5.2 System Example: Unmanned Air System (UAS).
In order to illustrate the application of realized functionality, consider an UAS
with a gimbaled camera designed to image a target. For the purposes of this example
there are four degrees of freedom (DoF): x, y, φ, and θ, where x and y are Cartesian
position coordinates, φ is the camera turret elevation, and θ is turret azimuth. An
image may be obtained by adjusting the state space x =[x y φ θ]T through a control
vector u.
First, consider the case where all degrees of freedom are enabled: u= [a(t) b(t)
c(t) d(t)]T , where a, b, c, and d are functions driving a constant rate of motion in each
DoF from start to stop. Here, the system may be defined as σ : ẋ = f(x,u). If each
DoF is exercised by the control vector, F(σ, L, τ,Ψ) = 8 (by virtue of only one start
and stop per DoF). This sets a lower bound on FM .
In the next case, the same UAS is restricted to move in only 3-DoF, having lost
the ability to rotate the turret due to damage (or a change to a fixed camera). The
vector u = [a(t) b(t) c(t) 0]T reflects the loss of control. If each available DoF is
exercised by u, F = 6, a lower bound for FM of this new system. This result is
intuitive, since the loss of a degree of freedom should reflect a loss in the functionality
of the system. The same trend is evident if we restrict the motion still further, such
that u = [0 0 c(t) 0]T . In this case, F = 2.
Extending the UAS example still further, suppose that the full-authority system is
able to satisfy the image equation by adjusting the value of only two DoF’s. However,
the controller opts to make movements in all 4 DoFs to obtain an image. This results
in an “excess” functionality, behavior which is not necessary to reach the goal, even
if it may allow for a shorter required time duration to obtain an image.
This example demonstrates why it is important to keep in mind the goals and
limitations of a functionality measure. Functionality is a reflection of a system’s
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potential behaviors, not of efficient behaviors. The choice of control vector, given
a system’s functionality, is what controls efficiency. Irrational actors can implement
control policies that produce highly complex behaviors, yet yield no benefit.
The effectiveness of a system can be measured by the choice of control vector
against some objective function. That effectiveness, however, is not a measure of its
functionality but what it does with that functionality.
In this UAS example, expected functionality may be calculated by determining a
probability mass function for the scenario set and summing the product of that func-
tion with the realized functionality for each scenario (as in Equation 14). Practically,
the scenario set will consist of the most likely operating conditions. The measure of
expected functionality may then be used to compare systems and determine suitabil-
ity. Similarly, maximum functionality (as in Equation 10) provides additional insight
into the functionality potential of the system, but expected functionality gives a more
complete picture for guiding system design.
3.6 Functionality, Energy Limits, and Energy Available
At first glance, it appears the F measure increases without bound as energy
increases. However, recall that F is based on physical processes and is subject to
physical limits; there is a limit to the amount of energy that physical systems may
contain (e.g. fuel tanks, vehicle structural limits).
The functional energy limits for a system depend on the form of the energy, the
rate of energy addition, and system structure.
Definition 11 A Functional Limit is the maximum amount of a type of energy a
system or a component can acquire before the system performs a function (to limit
energy gain) or reaches its capacity to absorb energy. The functional limit may be
dependent on the rate of energy addition for some systems, in that the functional limit
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can increase over time provided that energy is added at a sufficiently low rate.
A functional limit for an aircraft fuel tank is reached when the tank is at capacity.
The aircraft could also take action to halt fuel intake (perform a function) prior to
reaching capacity. In contrast, a destructive limit is reached if the tank is overpres-
surized and bursts. In reference to the rate of energy addition, this is not meant to
imply merely replace energy used for the same total limit. For example, a flexible
fuel bladder may have a larger capacity if it is filled at a slow rate than at a fast rate,
which would cause it to burst sooner.
Definition 12 Energy Available to a system is energy that is in a form where the
system can use it directly.
Energy is only usable to a system in particular forms. Consider solar energy:
it is not directly available to a typical aircraft, and therefore cannot be considered
available energy to the aircraft system. The addition of a photovoltaic cell to the
system, however, can allow direct use of solar energy. The solar energy could also be
indirectly used by soaring on thermal updrafts, for example.
A system may avoid reaching its destructive energy limit for a particular form of
energy by imposing a functional limit. Using the example above, a photovoltaic/-
battery system typically has a self-limiting mechanism that prevents consumption of
energy from reaching the destructive limit: overloading of the battery. However, such
a system has no functional mechanism to prevent reaching the destructive limit if
energy is in the form of intense electromagnetic energy (e.g. a high-powered laser).
These limits, functional and destructive, are dependent on both the form of energy
and the system under study. It should also be noted that a functional limit mechanism
may have an upper saturation limit which can be overcome with high enough energy.
For example, a munition may be engineered to be insensitive to electromagnetic
47
radiation (i.e. absorb it), a functional mechanism which might be defeated with
high enough energy levels of the same type of radiation.
The preceding definition enables the development of an assertion describing the
general relationship between energy and functionality.
If all other parameters are held constant, as the energy available to a system
increases, the system will maintain or increase in expected functionality, provided that
the destructive energy limit for the system is not exceeded. The converse is also true:
as the energy available to a system decreases, the system will maintain or decrease in
expected functionality.
So, as stated, as a system absorbs energy, functionality increases until reaching a
functional or destructive energy limit. If a functional limit, functionality will remain
constant. If a destructive limit, functionality will fall.
Using this assertion, it can be said that the addition of energy can move XS(α)
in time. The time evolution of the system state vector, and even the system size (the
minimal set of attributes for a complete system characterization), are influenced by
effects from the environment such as energy. The addition or removal of information
may also have such an effect, which will be explored in future research. Furthermore,
as a system uses energy (dissipating it to the environment), XS(α) shrinks. There
are fewer states to reach and less functionality to reach other states.
3.7 System Robustness and Resiliency
While it is generally asserted that increased functionality is a positive factor, this
section serves to illustrate how expected functionality directly contributes to system
success. Functionality is directly linked to success through the concept of reachable
states; specifically, states associated with success and the probability of reaching
them.
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Engineered systems are designed in response to a capability gap, or in order to
perform a set of tasks. For any engineered system in a particular scenario set, there
will be a set of final states which represent the desired outcome. These states may
be referred to as the success states.
As discussed in the previous section, the system state vector, XS(α), for a system
can change size in response to changes in energy (in particular, this means that
existing states could become frozen or enabled in response to energy changes). This
means that there is a change in the set of states that are reachable. Recall that system
state at a particular time includes all system attributes such as degrees of freedom,
constraints, system status, and logical structure. In general, a system with higher
functionality has more states available (reachable) than one with lower functionality.
While higher functionality can be associated with increased resiliency and robust-
ness, the concepts are not synonymous. As defined by the INCOSE Reslient Systems
Working Group, “Resilience is the capability of a system with specific characteristics
before, during and after a disruption to absorb the disruption, recover to an accept-
able level of performance, and sustain that level for an acceptable period of time.”
[37]
Robustness is the ability of a system to reject disturbances without altering its
state. A system is robust when it can continue functioning in the presence of internal
and external challenges without fundamental changes to the original system [35]. In
relation to the previous section on energy availability, robustness is the abiliy for a
system to retain reachable states in the event of falling available energy.
For this paper, robustness will be defined as the ability to remain in a mission
capable state and resilience will be defined as the ability to return to a mission capable
state. A mission capable state is one from which it is possible to reach a state that
defines success.
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The earlier section answered the question of what happens to functionality when
the energy available changes. This section will use resiliency and robustness to answer
the question of why excess functionality is desirable, again using the example of an
Unmanned Air System. In short, functionality that may be redundant in achieving
reachable success states may allow them to remain reachable in the face of degradation
(such as reduced available energy).
3.7.1 Functionality and Resiliency: A UAS Example.
Returning to the UAS with a gimbaled camera introduced earlier, suppose its
objective is to collect high-quality images of a particular target set. The success
states therefore include only outcomes where the UAS is positioned in such a manner
that it is within a specific range of the target, the target is within the camera’s field of
view, and the slant range is less that the maximum allowable. Clearly, any outcomes
where the UAS does not come within range of the target, whether due to energy
availability, threats, or damage constitute failure states. A state machine diagram for
the UAS is illustrated in Figure 9.
The UAS has a set of “mission capable” states that represent those states from
which the success states are achievable without a modification of the system. In other
words, the mission capable states are those where a function exists to move from that
state to a success state. Mathematically, if the set of success states is defined as
B ⊂ XS and the set of mission capable states is A ⊂ XS, for any α ∈ A there exists
a β ∈ B and an Fα,β such that an Fα,β = β.
In contrast, the failed states represent those from which the success states are
not achievable. Mathematically, for all α ∈ A there does not exist a β ∈ B where
Fα,β = β.
Suppose the UAS suffers damage or degradation as before where it has lost the
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Figure 5. State machine diagram for UAS operations
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ability to rotate the turret. At this point, the UAS enters a state where it attempts
to recover from the fault, from which the success states are not achievable without
system modification. To return to the set of mission capable states, the UAS must
adjust its control laws in order to position the camera without the turret rotation
DoF. This involves a manipulation of the other DoF’s, such as following a different
flight path.
The probability of success, Psuccess, for the UAS against its objective can be cal-
culated if the transition probabilities for the mission capable and recovery from fault
states are known.
3.7.2 Adaptability.
Life forms and civilizations fall into a class of complex systems that are often
termed “adaptive”. While definitions vary, a system that changes itself in response
to disturbances from the environment is generally considered as adaptable. The
change may manifest itself in structure or behavior, although presumably a change
in structure leads to a change in behavior.
In contrast, a flexible system can withstand or be modified in response to current
or expected disturbances from the environment (this is related to the definition for
robustness earlier). Flexibility here is adapted from Ryan’s definition of Design Flex-
ibility, which is defined as the degree to which a system can be modified to increase
its capability in response to forseeable external change [55].
Adaptation often seems to imply an improved suitability (fitness) to the environ-
ment, but the definition used here will not include such value judgements. Fitness
is determined according to some function (such as probability of survival) that could
yield different results depending on timescale or range of possible low-probability
high-impact (black swan) events. Thus, the ability to change (adapt) in response to
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the environment may not lead to a statistically favorable change in the long-term.
For the purposes of this research, an adaptive sytem will be defined in relation to
its expected functionality, which is a behavior-based metric.
Definition 13 An Adaptive System is one that can vary its expected functionality
over time.
It should be noted that any practical observation of adaptive systems per this
definition requires appropriate selection of τ , the epoch of observation.
Referring to the UAS discussion above, a system which is capable of traversing
through the recovering state is by definition adaptable.
3.7.3 Decline and Collapse.
In traditional combat models, such as those based on Lanchester equations, com-
bat is a process of attrition. The competitor with the superior combination of combat
effectiveness and numerical strength is pre-destined to emerge the victor. As real
combat, particularly the asymmetric conflicts of modern times, demonstrates, this
model has limited utility for accurately predicting combat outcomes. Real combat is
“nonlinear, uncertain, and complex with no outcome ever taken for granted.” [61]
One distinction between the two concepts is that between decline and collapse. In
traditional combat models, decline or degradation is the only form of relative perfor-
mance measurement. In real combat, there is not only smooth decline in functionality,
but rapid jumps that may be termed collapse.
As discussed above, graceful degradation or decline is manifest in a slow reduction
in expected functionality and collapse is a rapid reduction in expected functionality.
For this research, collapse will be defined as follows:
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Definition 14 Collapse is a rapid reduction in expected functionality, such that 0 >
ε >
dFX
dt
, where ε is an arbitrary constant.
In contrast, decline is defined as:
Definition 15 Decline is a slow reduction of expected functionality, such that 0 >
dFX
dt
> ε, where ε is an arbitrary constant.
A future goal of this research is to find values of ε for given systems, determine
the factors necessary for transitioning between decline and collapse (or alternatively,
increasing functionality), and if there are any patterns useful for understanding engi-
neered systems in general.
The value of ε will assuredly be dependent on the scale of the system. For example,
the ε for modern civilization might be very small as compared to a military system.
The speed of the reduction in functionality that might be a disaster for a civilization
could be an easily acceptable loss in a battle. Putting bounds on ε that relate to
system specifics could be very useful.
In practical terms, a decline (graceful degradation) allows a system to transition
to the recovering state. A collapse only allows transition to the failed states.
3.8 Conclusion
This paper established a number of definitions derived from literature, which sup-
port a method for measurement of system functionality. The terms defined include
system, dynamic system, function, functionality, system scale, functional level, and
scenario. Collectively, these terms enable definitions for realized functionality and
expected functionality, which use changes in kinetic energy to measure system func-
tionality for a given scenario or over the set of all possible scenarios, respectively.
In summary, this paper demonstrates the validity and use of a new measure of
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functionality in dynamic systems. Realized functionality can be used to compare
systems in identical scenario sets, measure historical functionality, or set bounds on
the maximum functionality. The work outlined in this paper meets the primary goal
for this research: developing a method to measure the functionality of a system in a
practical manner.
This paper also demonstrated clear linkages with assessing resilience and robust-
ness for a system. Future research on this topic will correlate the probablility of
system success with functionality, resilience, and robustness.
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IV. Information, Functionality, and Complexity
4.1 Introduction
Accounting for the impact of information in the design of systems and their func-
tion is a continuing challenge for systems engineers. Of primary concern for this
research is the effect of collecting information, processing it, and using it in order to
improve the functionality of a system.
The United States Department of Defense has put significant emphasis on Intel-
ligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) systems dedicated to the collection,
processing, and dissemination of information [39]. As ISR collection systems and
environments evolve, the need for a clear understanding of the relative merits of com-
peting system designs has become more evident. Some systems require extensive
manpower to spend long hours analyzing video [53], others provide information in
such volumes and formats that analysts experience information overload [40].
How much information do systems need in order to perform their missions? Does
information drive or enable system functionality? What role do changes in informa-
tion processes have in system failure or collapse? How can information overload be
managed? These are all questions for which this paper provides the foundations for
answers.
4.2 Functionality of Systems
Functionality and functions are fundamental concepts in designing systems [42].
Functions involve converting or channeling energy, material, and signals. An earlier
work by the authors [18] explored relationships between functionality and energy (and
by extension, material). This paper explores the relationship between functionality
and information (i.e. signals).
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Several key definitions are required from the authors’ earlier work in order to set
the context for this work. For a complete treatment, please refer to “Assessing system
functionality using an energy-based approach” by Clark, et. al [18].
A Function is a technical process involving flows within a system that modifies
the state vector (including quantity, direction, type, amplitude, frequency, or phase)
of a system. Mathematically, a function, fi, is a technical process within a system
S that modifies a subset of the state vectors Xi ⊂ XS. That is, fi ∈ FS such that
fi : α ⊂ XS → β ⊂ XS where α is a subset of the state vectors XS achievable by S
called the domain of fi. β is the range of fi, and also a subset of the state vector.
Functionality is the ability of a system, through use of functions, to affect its
degrees of freedom. Mathematically, for α and β ⊂ XS, functionality, Fα,β, is the
minimal set of all distinct functions f ∈ FS such that f(α) = β. It should be noted
that there may be multiple paths (multiple distinct functions, f) to move from one
state to another. This fact is of critical importance in understanding how information
impacts the increase or decrease of functionality.
A System is a collection of properties and relationships that exists as both a whole
and a part of a more expansive whole.
A Dynamic System is a collection of properties and relationships capable of
changing itself or the environment within which it exists in a manner not performable
by the elements alone.
A Functional Level is the system scale above which a particular functionality
is realized. The functionality of a system can be decomposed into progressively finer
scales. The functionality of interest may include a particular degree of freedom or a
set of them.
A Functional Interaction is an instance where, for a discrete element of a
system, its kinetic energy in the direction of a particular degree of freedom transitions
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from a non-zero value to a zero value, or from a zero to a non-zero value. For a car
travelling along a road, a functional interaction (with the road) occurs when the car
stops, starts again, or turns.
A Scenario is a unique set of system conditions to include inputs, constraints,
and initial states.
The preceding definitions allow for the definition of Realized Functionality over
an epoch, an arbitrary unit of time:
The Realized Functionality, F , of a system is the number of functional interac-
tions for a given scenario within a particular epoch and above a particular functional
level. Realized functionality is a measurement of demonstrated functionality.
4.2.1 Expected functionality.
Realized functionality, as defined earlier, is a single observation of a system re-
sponding to a particular scenario. Expected Functionality for a system σ may thus
be written as Equation 13 where FX is the expected functionality for a system (σ) at
a functional level L over an epoch τ , for any given scenario Si over the range of all
possible scenarios Ψ. F is the Cumulative Density Function (CDF) of Ψ.
FX(σ, L, τ,Ψ) ≡ E[F(σ, L, τ,Ψ)] =
∫
Ψ
F(σ, L, τ, Si)dF (Si) ≥ 0
(13)
For a set of finite, discrete, and independent scenarios, expected functionality for a
system σ may be written as Equation 14 where p(Si) is the probability mass function
over Ψ.
FX(σ, L, τ,Ψ) =
∑
Ψ
F(σ, L, τ, Si)p(Si) ≥ 0 (14)
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4.2.2 Expected functionality and energy available.
Previous work by the authors demonstrated analytically that a system’s expected
functionality is driven by the energy available to that system. [18] Energy available
to a system is energy that is in a form where the system can use it directly. However,
there are limits to the amount of energy a system may absorb, either destructive or
imposed by the system.
This framework enables the following assertion: If all other parameters are held
constant, as the energy available to a system increases, the system will maintain or
increase in expected functionality, provided that the destructive energy limit for the
system is not exceeded. The converse is also true: as the energy available to a system
decreases, the system will maintain or decrease in expected functionality.
In other words, increasing energy increases functionality in a system until that
system stops the input or breaks.
4.3 Functionality and complexity
In systems engineering, the concepts of functionality and complexity are often
intertwined. Complexity creeps in as the desire for increased functionality required
for solutions to daunting challenges grows. Its characteristics appear in suddenly
critical problems of modern civilization that were nonexistent mere years before.
And of primary interest for this paper, complexity provides the needed link between
functionality and information effects.
As this research has examined and precisely defined functionality, it is now neces-
sary to do the same for complexity. This presents a challenge, however, as there are
many (often mutually exclusive) definitions for complexity. The following section will
present these multiple views of complexity, but for clarity the key ideas on complexity
asserted in this paper are stated here: 1) Complexity is measurable for any dynamic
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system; 2) Complexity is positively correlated with functionality; and 3) Complexity
is manifest through the behavior of a system. These ideas will be developed in this
section.
4.3.1 Definitions of complexity.
There are a wide variety of approaches to defining and measuring complexity
throughout the literature on complexity theory. In many cases throughout the lit-
erature, it seems the authors are speaking of different or even mutually exclusive
phenomena. The most apt summary of the diversity of approaches is the tongue-in-
cheek assertion of the nature of complexity by researcher Seth Lloyd: “I can’t define
it for you, but I know it when I see it” [20].
A root cause in the lack of unified definitions of complexity is that there are in
fact several types of complexity. The first formal treatment of complexity focused
on algorithmic complexity, which reflects the computation requirements for a math-
ematical process. [20] Senge and Sterman include also dynamic complexity, which
is primarily characterized by difficult-to-discern cause-effect relations [59] [62]. To
further muddy the waters, there are the concepts of Complex Systems and Complex
Adaptive Systems.
Sheard and Mostashari [60] discuss some aspects that describe a complex system.
These include: being composed of many autonomous, yet interacting, components
or agents (leading to such phenomena as feedback); being self-organizing; displaying
emergent macro-level behavior; and adapting to the environment (fitness landscape).
Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS) extend the concept of complex systems into a
more specialized class. A CAS can be characterized by the following properties: the
system consists of a network of many agents acting in parallel; it has many levels of
organization; it anticipates the future; and it has many fitness “niches” which can
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be exploited by agents adapted for the purpose. [67] All of these properties serve
to enable emergence – a collective property of a system that cannot be predicted by
examining each agent individually.
Important to CAS is the concept of dynamic equilibrium, or homeostasis. CAS
are “living” systems (usually not just figuratively), with constantly moving processes.
[48] With a dynamic system, something must always occur (or be occurring) for the
system to operate. If that something is interrupted or modified it can have profound
effects on the system’s seemingly stable behavior.
These concepts (complex systems and CAS) help define a class of systems that
may be considered “complex”. The definition of this class is useful for understanding
when to apply particular analysis and design techniques. In order to apply these
techniques, it is necessary to understand what comprises complexity and whether it
is a measurable aspect.
One of the most workable definitions of complexity is that of thermodynamic
depth. Properties of thermodynamic depth as complexity assert that complexity “is
a measure of how hard it is to put something together”. [45] [22] [44]
Bar-Yam defines the complexity of a physical system as the length of the shortest
string, s, that can represent its properties. This can be the result of measurements
and observations over time. [5] However, there are some inherent difficulties in us-
ing these definitions. For one, it is very difficult to approach a macro-level system,
particularly one with hidden structure, and determine its information content. While
information and thermodynamics-based measures form a theoretical basis for com-
plexity measurement, there remains a need for a more accessible route; particularly
one relevant for systems engineering.
There are hints that energy plays a role in defining complexity. As a general rule,
systems commonly recognized as complex process more energy than less complex
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systems. For instance, civilizations move process energy than a single town. However,
energy flow is not a good measure of complexity, since a single arbitrary large-bore
flow, such as large “pipe” (a relatively simple system), could be constructed with the
identical energy flow as a more complex system.
A metric that solves the apparent large-bore contradiction is proposed by Chais-
son, which was initially used as a means to classify the complexity of stars. By
measuring the energy rate density in Equation 47, where Φm is the energy rate den-
sity, E is energy flow through a system, τ is the time epoch, and m is system mass,
Chaisson obtains results that correlate well with other notions of complexity. [13]
However, the energy rate density metric has some drawbacks. By normalizing with
respect to mass, this metric produces incorrect results for complexity when compar-
ing some systems. For example, suppose an electronic brain is built to mimic the
operation of a human brain. The human brain may process energy at the same rate
as a theoretical electronic brain, but due to differences in basic materials (i.e. the
weight of neurons vs. semi-conductors), the two systems, which most theorists would
recognize as identically complex, could have vastly different Φm values. Thus, by nor-
malizing with respect to mass instead of function, the Φm metric produces incorrect
results for the relative complexity of systems.
Φm =
E
τm
(15)
A practical difficulty in using the Φm metric is determining the appropriate mass
and energy to use. In measuring the Φm of a civilization, Chaisson uses the mass
of humanity and the total energy processed by the civilization. However, the total
energy of a civilization does not flow through only its humans, but also its machinery,
beasts of burden, vehicles, etc., the mass of which is a difficult quantity to measure.
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4.3.2 Behavioral complexity and functionality.
All complexity metrics discussed thus far contribute ideas toward a measure that:
• Correlates with notions of complexity at all scales
• Is measurable for any dynamical system
• May be practically employed
Further development is needed in order to define a measure of complexity that
meets these criteria and is thus useful for systems engineering. To bridge that gap,
the authors propose a new approach to viewing complexity.
As discussed in the previous section, complexity is described as a measure of
computational difficulty, difficulty of assembly, or difficulty of description. As stated
previously, the authors view these as different aspects of the same phenomenon. In
addition to the three aspects just described, it is proposed that the complexity of
a system can be illustrated by observing its behavior – the assertion here is that a
system that is difficult to compute, assemble, or describe will behave in a manner
that is difficult to compute, assemble, or describe. If one can measure this behavior
in a meaningful way, it should provide a reliable barometer of the system’s inherent
complexity.
This notion of complex behavior being a characteristic of complex systems is not
necessarily new. Consider the energy rate density metric: Chaisson’s core assertion is
that increasingly complex systems will process energy at a (mass-normalized) higher
rate. This is a clear link between system complexity and behavior. The Φm metric,
however, has drawbacks for its wider application as discussed earlier.
The measure of behavioral complexity is the measure of how a system functions.
As such, it is proposed that expected functionality can serve as a proxy measure of
a system’s behavioral complexity. The authors assert here that system functionality
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increases with system complexity. That is, a more complex system will have a higher
expected functionality. The next section will explore the validity of this relationship.
4.4 Functionality and information
4.4.1 Linking functionality with information-based complexity.
The purpose of this paper is to explore the effect of changing information on
functionality. To enable this exploration, it is necessary to first link functionality
with complexity.
Previous research has established complexity metrics through use of information
theory. Bar-Yam and others define complexity of a system as the length of the shortest
information string s that can completely represent the properties of that system. This
complexity value is equivalent to the information content of a system [5].
This paper does not propose that expected functionality is equivalent to Bar-Yam
complexity, but it is asserted here that there should be a correlation between the
two measurement approaches. This assertion is difficult to demonstrate analytically,
however it is possible to demonstrate common trends with limited examples. It is
important to consider that realized functionality measures system behavior whereas
Bar-Yam complexity measure system information content. As discussed, it follows
intuitively that a system with more complex behavior would take more information
to describe than a system with less complex behavior.
Consider a vehicle-road system such that the vehicle is constrained to move ac-
cording to a grid as shown in Figure 6. The car starts any given scenario at point ‘A’,
may travel along the line segments (each of length N), but may only start or stop at
the labeled locations (e.g. no stopping in the middle of the freeway).
The scenario set, Ψ, is the set of all possible scenarios that drive a unique system
response. For a given time epoch, τ = 6T in this case, the complexity of each scenario
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Figure 6. Vehicle and road system 1
is shown in Table 2. Examining scenario S2 more closely, the complexity is calculated
by first counting the starts and stops in particular directions: start at A, stop at
intersection; start in new direction, stop at B. This yields a total of 4 counts. As
the epoch size increases or the car gains functionality (e.g. greater maximum speed),
complexity increases.
Bar-Yam complexity, description of the system, requires an information coding
scheme for measurement. Since the road network itself is static, its information
entropy H = 0. To describe the behaviour of the car, one must know τ ; whether it
moved from A, or whether it moved to B or C; from there, whether it moved again;
and so forth.
Assume that when the car moves, it does so at a speed of 1 N/T, where T is the
time unit. An example of the minimum string length encoding τ = 5T is shown in
Figure 7.
Figure 7. Information string describing the movement of the vehicle
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Table 2. Behavioral complexity of car given particular scenarios
Scenario Functionality Distance Order
S1 = Car doesn’t move F = 0 0L 1
S2 = Move from A - B F = 4 2L 2
S2A = Move from A - B - C F = 6 4L 3
S2A1 = Move from A - B - C - A F = 10 6L 4
S2A2 = Move from A - B - C - B F = 8 6L 5
S2B = Move from A - B - A F = 8 4L 6
S2B1 = Move from A - B - A - B F = 12 6L 7
S2B2 = Move from A - B - A - C F = 12 6L 8
...
...
...
S3 = Move from A - C F = 4 2L 9
S3A = Move from A - C - B F = 6 4L 10
S3A1 = Move from A - C - B - A F = 10 6L 11
S3A2 = Move from A - C - B - C F = 8 6L 12
S3B = Move from A - C - A F = 8 4L 13
S3B1 = Move from A - C - A - B F = 12 6L 14
S3B2 = Move from A - C - A - C F = 12 6L 15
...
...
...
For τ = 2T, we obtain the following set of encodings for each possible scenario: I1
= 10 00; I2 = 10 01; I3 = 10 10. The first block is the time, 2, converted to binary and
the next block designates 00 for staying at A, 01 for moving to B, or 10 for moving to
C. The set Ψ = S1 S2 S3; no other set of scenarios can cause the system to respond
in a unique way in the given epoch. The expected functionality, assuming a uniform
distribution of scenarios, is calculated as in equation 16.
FX = 0 ∗ 13 + 4 ∗
1
3
+ 4 ∗ 1
3
≈ 2.67 (16)
By varying the epoch size, vehicle speed, and size of the road network, a series
of values for expected functionality and string length (s) can be calculated. The
results for varying scenario distributions are shown in Figure 8. The Gaussian Normal
distribution is defined according to equation 17, where µ is the mean (in this case the
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mean scenario) and σ is the standard deviation. For Figure 8, µ = 8 and σ = 2. The
Triangular distribution is calculated according to equation 18 where a is the lower
limit, b is the upper limit, and c is the mode. For Figure 8, a, b, and c vary with the
size of the scenario space to (arbitrarily) correspond with the first, middle, and last
on the list, respectively. The scenarios are ordered according to the last column of
Table 2.
P (x) = 1
σ
√
2π
e−(x−µ)
2/2σ2 (17)
P (x) =

0, for x < a
2(x− a)
(b− a)(c− a)
, for a ≤ x < c
2
b− a
, for x = c
2(b− x)
(b− a)(b− c)
, for c < x ≤ b
0, for b < x
(18)
Using the results from this example, it is reasonable to state that expected func-
tionality and Bar-Yam complexity have an analogous relationship. While a closed
proof of this relationship has not been completed, this assertion is sufficient to pro-
ceed with using techniques established forcomplexity on functionality.
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Figure 8. Shortest string length vs. Total complexity for the vehicle-road example
system for different scenario set distribution types
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4.5 Effect of information on expected functionality
As stated earlier, the purpose of this paper is to establish the relationship between
information and functionality in the same manner already accomplished for energy
and functionality. To do so requires exploration of key concepts in information theory.
4.5.1 Requisite variety.
Ashby’s Law of Requisite Variety (LRV) defines variety as the number of elements
(or states) in a set that can be distinguished. [3] As an example, the set {b r b a b r}
has a variety of 3 letters. Variety can refer to specific events, scenarios, or actions. In
order for a regulator R to control a set of disturbances D to yield a specific favorable
outcome from set E (the set of all desired outcomes) it must have at least as many
possible responses as there are disturbances. [3] If the same response was applied to
two different disturbances, there would be two different values in the outcome set,
E (a specific outcome is determined by both the disturbance and response). This
is uncontrolled regulation, since there is no control over which specific outcome is
reached; it is controlled only by the disturbance itself. It should be noted that having
such a degree of variety does not necessarily say whether that regulator’s reponses
successfully counter every disturbance to yield an outcome in E, though it is more
likely to do so.
In order to guarantee a favorable outcome, over a given epoch a system must (as
a minimum requirement) have greater than or equal to the amount of variety of its
environment, or Vsystem ≥ Venvironment. [3]
For the systems engineer, says Boardman, this may be interpreted as “for a system
to survive in its environment the variety of choice that the system is able to make
must equal or exceed the variety of influences that the environment can impose on
the system.” [8] In an environment of infinite possibilities, this implies that a system
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must have an infinite variety of choices (degrees of freedom) in order to ensure success.
It is obviously not feasible to design a system with infinite degrees of freedom, but it
is possible to create systems that may succeed in an infinite environment for a finite
period of time. Life itself is the clearest example. However, per the Law of Requisite
Variety, a favorable outcome can not be guaranteed, but the more variety the more
likely a system is to survive.
The concept of variety enables a smooth transition between multiple concepts,
including entropy, complexity, and functionality. Entropy can be considered as a
probabilistic measure of variety, and if every state is equiprobable, entropy reduces
to variety exactly. [30]
In information theory, a dynamic system (Ω, B, P , Z) is measured using a finite
alphabet mapping, f : Ω→ A, where Ω is a measurable event space, B is a particular
collection of subsets of Ω, P is a probability measure, Z is a transformation of the
event space such that Z : Ω→ Ω (such as time), and A is an alphabet.[27] It should
be noted that an alphabet is not limited to something akin to our familiar A through
Z; a set as vast as the complete set of words in the English language can constitute
an alphabet in this treatment.
The entropy of a random variable, a, from that alphabet may be defined as:
H(f) = −
∑
a∈A
pf (a) ln(pf (a)) (19)
where pf is the probability mass function of f . [27] This expression is clearly
analogous to thermodynamic entropy. The difference is the thermodynamic states,
designated here as Ω, have been mapped to a set of information states, A.
Just as thermodynamic entropy is regarded as a measure of the uncertainty of the
state of a system, information entropy is considered a measure of the uncertainty of
the information about the state of a system. Using this understanding of the nature
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of information uncertainty, it is possible to understand the links between variety,
complexity, and information.
If entropy, H, expresses the uncertainty about a system’s state, then if the state
of a system is known exactly, H = 0 (state probability = 1). Using this approach,
the LRV may be formulated in terms of entropy, as Ashby demonstrated in Equation
20. In this equation, E is the set of essential (desired) system states, D is the set of
environmental disturbances, R is the set of system responses, and K is a buffering
term (reflecting dissipative factors in the total system). [3]
H(E) ≥ H(D)−H(R)−K (20)
To visualize each of the terms, recall that entropy is essentially a measure of
the number of possible states for a system; therefore, H(R) is a reflection of the
number of possible states for the regulator. As Heylighen emphasises [30], however,
the formulation in Equation 20 includes the assumption that the system will always
perfectly select the best response to counter any particular disturbance. Allowing for
imperfect selection yields a revised relation of equation 21.
H(E) ≥ H(D) +H(R|D)−H(R)−K (21)
The conditional entropy termH(R|D) represents the uncertainty that the response
set can match the disturbance set. It is calculated as usual for entropy, but the
conditional probabilities are used. If response r is one response in set R (r ∈ R) and
disturbance d is a disturbance in set D (d ∈ D), then the conditional entropy for each
disturbance is found using Equation 22. H(R|D) is calculated by summing over the
full set of D. [30]
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H(R|d) = −
∑
r∈R
pf (r|d) ln(pf (r|d)) (22)
Bar-Yam demonstrated the extension of variety to his measurement of complexity
[6] as shown in equation 23, where Psuccess is the probability of a desired outcome,
C(e) is the complexity of the environment, and C(a) is the complexity of the system
in question. Recall that Bar-Yam complexity is measured using binary string length,
hence the base 2 logarithm. Note that the buffering term, K, is neglected. Also,
Bar-Yam’s equation makes the earlier assumption of perfect application of responses.
0 ≤ − log2(Psuccess(a)) < C(e)− C(a) (23)
As was discussed earlier, expected functionality may be assumed analogous to
information complexity for the purposes of this paper. It is then possible to rewrite
equation 23 as equation 24, where Ψe and Ψa are the scenario distributions for ob-
serving the environment (e) and system (a), respectively.
− log2(Psuccess(a)) < FX(e, L, τ,Ψe)−FX(a, L, τ,Ψa) (24)
In order to incorporate “imperfect” systems, we must include a term that functions
as the H(R|D) term in equation 21. If we define the probability that the system
behaviour response does not match (counter) the environmental disturbance as P (Ya),
then the term defined in equation 25 captures the lack of ability for a system to
perfectly counter its environment. In contrast to FX , FY is the expected functionality
conditioned on the occurrence of all the events Ya where the system reponse does not
counter the disturbance. We may then rewrite equation 24 as equation 26.
FY (a, L, τ,Ψa) ≡
∑
Ψa
F(a, L, τ, Si|Ya) P (Ya) p(Si) (25)
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− log2(Psuccess(a)) <
FX(e, L, τ,Ψe) + FY (a, L, τ,Ψa)−FX(a, L, τ,Ψa)
(26)
Another factor impacts success probability: the amount of information a system
has about its environment, or the observed complexity (functionality). Up until now,
it was assumed that the system had perfect knowledge of its environment and so will
choose the best response. Under most practical scenarios, it is not possible to know
all the information amount the environment or another system, and therefore the true
value of this ratio cannot be known. However, comparisons between systems using
this framework are useful, as will be shown in later sections. The term Ie is defined
here as the ratio of information the system possesses about the environment to the
total information that exists about the environment. This is conveniently expressed
using ratios of entropy, such that Ie = 1−Ho(e)/H(e) = (H(e)−Ho(e))/H(e) where
H(e) is the maximum possible information entropy for the environment and Ho(e) is
the information entropy after observation of the environment. If the environment is
completely known by the system, Ie = 1 since the uncertainty in observation is zero.
Conversely, if the system possesses no information on the environment, Ho(e) = H(e)
and Ie = 0. The inclusion of this consideration yields equation 27.
− log2(Psuccess(a)) < FX(e, L, τ,Ψe)+
FY (a, L, τ,Ψa)
1
Ie
−FX(a, L, τ,Ψa)Ie
(27)
In the complete absence of information, Ie = 0 (and its inverse goes to infinity),
and Psuccess ≥ 0. Under perfect information, Ie = 1, and the expression reverts to the
previous one (equation 26). Note that this is a different concept than the imperfect
knowledge term; that term assumes perfect observation of the environment. If the
system can’t observe its environment, it can’t possibly know which response to apply.
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4.5.2 Effect of information changes.
In the authors’ earlier work [18], it was shown how the addition of energy can
move XS(α) in time. Specifically, the addition of energy (below destructive limits)
increased the size of XS(α) and the removal of energy decreased it. Similarly, this
section will demonstrate that the addition of information reduces the likelihood of
a decrease of XS(α), provided that both the cost of obtaining the information is
relatively small and the information can be processed by the system.
Clearly, a winning strategy for all systems is to maximize the amount of infor-
mation known about the environment. Unfortunately, there is an energy cost to
obtaining information. For every unit of information obtained, it costs the gaining
system some amount of energy to gather it and process it, which in turn has the
potential to reduce functionality. This relates to the problem of information overload
or paralysis. Tainter [66] describes this as the problem that as knowledge grows more
complex, the production of that knowledge becomes subject to diminishing returns.
Stated in terms of the definitions established in this paper, as the functionality of
the system under observation increases, the cost to process information about that
system increases.
This concern can be resolved with the addition of a correction term that accounts
for the energy cost of information, φ(EA, EC(Ie,∆Ie)). Here, φ is a function of the
energy available, EA, and energy cost of the change in information, EC(Ie,∆Ie), such
that φ(EA, 0) = 1 and φ(EA, EA) = 0. Notionally, φ approximates as in equation 28,
although the exact form for it may differ for any given system. The function φ will
not graduate as smoothly for all systems, but the form given in equation 28 can be
considered a reasonable approximation (this follows from the Taylor approximation).
(Note that EC has units of energy.)
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φ(EA, EC(Ie,∆Ie)) ≈ 1−
EC(Ie,∆Ie)
EA
(28)
Incorporating the correction term φ leads to a revised expression for Psuccess from
equation 27 to that in equation 29.
− log2(Psuccess(a)) < FX(e, L, τ,Ψe)+
FY (a, L, τ,Ψa)
1
Ie + ∆Ie
1
φ(EA, EC(Ie,∆Ie))
−
FX(a, L, τ,Ψa)(Ie + ∆Ie)φ(EA, EC(Ie,∆Ie))
(29)
From this expression, it can be shown that Psuccess increases with increased infor-
mation only if φ(EA, EC(Ie,∆Ie)) > 0. Stated simply, the probability of success for
a system increases with the addition of information, as long as the cost of obtaining
that information is less than the energy available. The smaller the cost, the more im-
pact the information has on increasing the probability of success. A further condition,
however, is that the energy cost is not sufficient to reduce functionality; recall that
a reduction in energy available results in lower or an unchanged value for expected
functionality. In other words, the probability of success for a system increases with
the addition of information, provided EC << EA.
The discussion above also allows for the following assertion regarding functionality
(as opposed to probability of success above):
As a system’s information on its environment increases, the probability that a
system will apply the most suitable functions increases, provided that EC << EA.
From Clark 2015 [18], it is known that as energy available, EA, increases the
size of XS(α) increases. Simliarly, as EA falls, XS(α) decreases. Since adding more
information (∆Ie) to a system reduces EA by an amount EC , the addition of that
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information causes a decrease in the size of XS(α). However, if a system posesses
more information, it is more likely to select the correct function from within Fα,β, the
minimal set of all distinct functions f ∈ FS such that f(α) = β. The lack of that
information does not remove any inherent functionality, but it reduces the system’s
probability of successfully applying the most suitable functions.
From this discussion, it can be said that information increases the “functional
efficiency” of a system. Thus, as stated before, the more information a system gains,
the greater its chances for success. Less information about the functionality of the en-
vironment increases the probability of encountering a destructive or functional limit.
Encountering a destructive limit reduces functionality, which reduces chances of suc-
cess and moves the system into a “Recovery from Fault” state (see Figure 9, which is
reprinted from [18]. The probability of transition to the success states is lower since
there is a non-zero probability of transition to the set of failed states.
A system has a set of “mission capable” states from which the success states are
achievable without a modification of the system. In other words, the mission capable
states are those where a function exists to move from that state to a success state.
Mathematically, let the set of success states be defined as B ⊂ XS and the set of
mission capable states be A ⊂ XS, then given α ∈ A, there exists a function f ∈ Fα,β
such that f(α) = β.
In contrast, the failed states represent those from which the success states are not
achievable. Mathematically, let C be the set of all “Failed” states, then for all c ∈ C
and all β ∈ B, Fc,β = ∅ (the empty set).
To illustrate, a car that lacks information about an on-rushing car is more likely to
encounter a destructive limit than a car possessing that information. That informa-
tion is not enough, however; the car must also possess a high-enough functionality (i.e.
ability to maneuver or brake) to have a chance of escaping its fate. This illustrates
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Figure 9. State machine diagram for UAS operations
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a compounding feedback mechanism inherent to dynamic systems: decreased infor-
mation leads to a system decreasing its functionality due to poorly applied functions,
and both effects further yield a decrease in probabilty of success.
Stated in this way, information is a preventative factor. It helps prevent reduction
of functionality, but does not directly increase functionality. This idea also accounts
for irrelevant information. If information is obtained about a completely unrelated
system, such as the behavior of an anti-aircraft system in a distant country, it has no
bearing on improving the chances of maintaining or increasing the functionality of a
combat UAS. In fact, the act of obtaining that information could negatively impact
probability of survival, as shown above.
4.6 Using expected functionality for system applications
4.6.1 Cooperative systems.
There are a number of applications to which these relations can be applied. One
possible application is cooperative systems, such as Boids [15]. Here, systems a1 and
a2 refer to two boid-governed systems (e.g. aircraft) that make up a cooperative flock.
It is assumed for simplicity that systems a1 and a2 have the same observations of the
external environment, yielding equations 30 and 31.
− log2(Psuccess(a1)) < FX(e, L, τ,Ψe)+
FY (a1, L, τ,Ψa1)
1
Ie
−FX(a1, L, τ,Ψa1)Ie
(30)
− log2(Psuccess(a2)) < FX(e, L, τ,Ψe)+
FY (a2, L, τ,Ψa2)
1
Ie
−FX(a2, L, τ,Ψa2)Ie
(31)
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In the case of cooperative systems, success of one system is positively related to
that of the other. Adding Equations 30 and 31 captures the reinforcing effect of
cooperation on success probability:
− log2(Psuccess(a1))− log2(Psuccess(a2)) <
FX(e, L, τ,Ψe) + FY (a1, L, τ,Ψa1)
1
Ie
−FX(a1, L, τ,Ψa1)Ie + FX(e, L, τ,Ψe)+
FY (a2, L, τ,Ψa2)
1
Ie
−FX(a2, L, τ,Ψa2)Ie
(32)
Alternately, this may be written as:
− log2(Psuccess(a1) Psuccess(a2)) <
2 ∗ FX(e, L, τ,Ψe)+
(FY (a1, L, τ,Ψa1) + FY (a2, L, τ,Ψa2)
1
Ie
−(FX(a1, L, τ,Ψa1) + FX(a2, L, τ,Ψa2))Ie
(33)
However, the expected functionality of each boid is dependent on the influence
of its partner. For the system a1, its expected functionality can be decomposed into
the portion that may be influenced by system a2 and the portion that may not. If
we define the probability that system a2 may influence a1 as P (W21), then the term
defined in equation 34 captures only the functionality due to the influence of the
cooperative system. In contrast to FX , FW2 is the expected functionality conditioned
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upon all the events where system a2 influences system a1. It is assumed that the
probability of cooperative influence is independent of the scenario distribution. This
limiting assumption can be relaxed by replacing P (W21) with P (W21|Si).
FW2(a1, L, τ,Ψa1) ≡
∑
Ψa1
F(a1, L, τ, Si|W21)P (W21)p(Si) (34)
Similarly, the effect of boid system a1 on system a2 can be written as equation
35.
FW1(a2, L, τ,Ψa2) ≡
∑
Ψa2
F(a2, L, τ, Si|W12)P (W12)p(Si) (35)
The complement, the probability that a2 may not influence a1, is defined as
P (W c21) ≡ 1− P (W21). Equations 36 and 37 capture the functionality of a1 and a2,
respectively, where the systems can not influence one another.
FW c2 (a1, L, τ,Ψa1) ≡
∑
Ψa1
F(a1, L, τ, Si|W c21)P (W c21)p(Si) (36)
FW c1 (a2, L, τ,Ψa2) ≡
∑
Ψa2
F(a2, L, τ, Si|W c12)P (W c12)p(Si) (37)
The influence of boid a2 on boid a1 (and vice versa) can be decomposed into
influence resulting from information exchange (i.e. communication) and influence
with no information exchange (i.e. lift from wingtip vortices, collision). The term
I12 is defined here as the ratio of information system a1 possesses about a2 to the
total information that exists about a2. On the other hand, mechanisms where a2
can influence a1 without the requirement of information exchange can be assumed
as part of the environmental behavior. For systems with large separations between
cooperative systems, this effect can be neglected entirely. Note the distinction here
is that while it may be possible to infer information about the other system through
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indirect sensing, collisions, or wingtip vortices, there is no directed transmission of
information. Direct observation, such as optical detection, is considered directed
transmission of information (via reflected or emitted photons).
The expected functionality for system a1 is therefore defined in equation 38.
FX(a1, L, τ,Ψa1) ≡ FW2(a1, L, τ,Ψa1)I12
+FW c2 (a1, L, τ,Ψa1)
(38)
If a2 can not influence a1, FX(a1, L, τ,Ψa1) = FW c2 (a1, L, τ,Ψa1). If a1 has no
information on a2, FX(a1, L, τ,Ψa1) = FW c2 (a1, L, τ,Ψa1).
For an n-boid system, the expected functionality for a given boid may be written
as equation 39
FX(ai, L, τ,Ψai) =
n∑
j=1
j 6=i
(
FWj(ai, L, τ,Ψai)Iij
+FW cj (ai, L, τ,Ψai)
) (39)
For the n-boid system a, if mission success for the System of Systems is dependent
on the success of each boid, the probability of success for the boid System of Systems
as a whole may be defined as equation 40.
Psuccess(a) ≡
n∏
i=1
Psuccess(ai) (40)
If mission success does not require that every boid be successful, then the prob-
ability of success for the System of Systems becomes equation 41, adapted from
reliability engineering [1]. For example, swarm success may be defined as at least
one boid reaching a target area; if the rest are destroyed along the way, their lack
of success does not negate the overall mission success. This section will build from
equation 40 for clarity.
81
Psuccess(a) ≡
n∑
i=k
(
n
k
)
(Psuccess(ai))
i(1− Psuccess)n−i (41)
Based on equation 40, the general expression for Psuccess(a) without cooperative
influence may then be written as equation 42.
− log2(Psuccess(a)) <
n∏
i=1
[
FX(e, L, τ,Ψe)+
FY (ai, L, τ,Ψai)
1
Ie
−FX(ai, L, τ,Ψai)Ie
] (42)
Upon including cooperative influence equation 42 becomes equation 43.
− log2(Psuccess(a)) <
n∏
i=1
[
FX(e, L, τ,Ψe)+
FY (ai, L, τ,Ψai)
1
Ie
−
n∑
j=1
j 6=i
(
FWj(ai, L, τ,Ψai)(Iij)
+FW cj (ai, L, τ,Ψai)
)]
(43)
So, probability of success for a boid flock depends on the relative functionality
of the boid system with respect to its environment, the information the boid system
has about the functionality of its environment, and the information each boid has
about the rest of the flock. The term Iji can be regarded as the degree to which a
system’s component is aware of its other components. If a system doesn’t know its
capabilities, it is unlikely to use that unknown capability.
Since a system with high functionality has more direction changes (functional
interactions) than a system with low functionality, it can be inferred that a higher
functionality system is generally more difficult to track. For a boid being tracked
by its neighbor, higher functionality results in a lower probability of success for the
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tracker; if being tracked by an enemy, higher functionality results in a higher success
rate for the boid. Thus, there is an inherent design tension with competing goals to
keep the functionality for each individual Boid as small as possible, while maximizing
the functionality of the Boid flock as a whole.
This result is consistent with theories from systems architecture (and in fact ex-
tends them), articulated by Maier and Rechtin with a heuristic: “In partitioning,
choose the elements so that they are as independent as possible; that is, choose ele-
ments with low external complexity and high internal complexity.” [46] The heuristic,
as written, applies to cooperative systems. Thus, a boid aircraft should have high
functionality at the subsystem level, but low functionality at the system level – so
that its compatriots can track it. However, for competitive systems, the heuristic is
reversed; the system should be as functional as possible. So, for a cooperative boid
system engaged with an outside competitor: each boid should have high subsystem-
level functionality, low system-level functionality, and high system-of-systems-level
functionality. This extended heuristic emphasizes why engineering cooperative com-
bat systems is truly a difficult design problem.
It is clear from this formulation that a flock with more information is more likely
to be successful due to appropriate choice of functions (functional efficiency). This
information could include details about the operating environment, such as winds, ob-
stacles, and targets; and details about other boids, such as operating limits, predicted
responses to disturbances, and so forth.
The effect of the heuristic set on functionality is more complicated to identify, since
the effect depends on the nature of the rules. For instance, in a system with only
Boid collision avoidance rules, the velocity matching rule tends to decrease realized
functionality. Aligning the headings of the vehicles (one of the generalized coordinate
directions) reduces the number of instances where their headings and relative positions
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require change to avoid collision. The velocity matching rule would also likely reduce
the number of obstacle collision course corrections required.
Determining the effect of neighborhood size on functionality is very difficult to
predict, since the number of boids within another boid’s neighborhood changes with
time. It could be that this effect is highly system-dependent
4.6.2 Competitive systems.
The idea regarding the amount of information a system has on its environment
can be generalized still further. If a competitive system can be isolated from the
environment (e.g. the on-coming car in the earlier example), the survival probability
expression for a system, designated a1 here, may be written as:
− log2(Psuccess(a1)) < FX(a2, L, τ,Ψa2)+
FY (a1, L, τ,Ψa1)
1
Ia2
−FX(a1, L, τ,Ψa1)Ia2
(44)
Success in this instance refers to success against a particular external system (a2).
This equation, however, makes the assumption that the opposing system (a2) blindly
applies disturbances. We need also consider the effects of an active opponent system,
where the probability of success of its mission is:
− log2(Psuccess(a2)) < FX(a1, L, τ,Ψa1)+
FY (a2, L, τ,Ψa2)
1
Ia1
−FX(a2, L, τ,Ψa2)Ia1
(45)
Note that each system’s application of responses (or disturbances, depending on
your perspective) may still yield success even if blindly applied. However, the more in-
formation possessed by system a1, the more likely it is to be successful and conversely
84
for system a2.
One reason these relationships exist as probabilistic expressions, rather than de-
terministic, is that it is certainly possible for a low functionality system to defeat a
high functionality system. Examples abound, such as a rock thrown into a jet en-
gine, Spartacus defeating the Romans, and bacteria killing a human. Yet, over the
full scenario space, a fighter jet is more likely to smite a rock thrower, the Romans
eventually defeated Spartacus, and most bacteria or viruses are overcome by immune
systems or medicines. The important point here is that higher functionality does not
always mean victory, but improves the chances of seeing it.
4.6.3 Application Example: UAS System-of-Systems.
The following example serves to illustrate the application of the concepts devel-
oped thus far, particularly with cooperative systems. Suppose a System-of-Systems
(SoS) composed of 10 small UAS (Unmanned Air Systems) is tasked to observe ac-
tivity at a fixed SAM (Surface-to-Air Missile) site. The success criteria for the SoS
is defined as: Continuous coverage of the target in the interval between first arrival
on station and end of task. ”Coverage” occurs when a UAS is within 200 ft.
Suppose that the cooperative algorithm under consideration allows the UAS to
influence one another only when within 500 ft. (Influence includes changing heading
or speed.)
The concept developer is to look at three instantiations of the SoS, one using
no communications or sensing of other UAS (SoS1), one using sensing only and no
communications (SoS2), and one using full communications and sensing (SoS3). En-
vironmental information Ie is constant for all SoS, as is the scenario distribution.
For any given pop-up threat, its probability of occurrence within the overall scenario
distribution is constant across the different SoS.
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4.6.3.1 SoS1.
SoS1 does not use the cooperative algorithm under consideration, since there is no
means to make the UAS cooperate. Coverage is accomplished using synchronization,
where each UAS flies a prescribed path optimized to provide full coverage. This
technique works for nominal scenarios, but for unplanned obstacles or pop-up threats,
such an algorithm is unable to recover.
As compared to an adaptive system, there will be a greater number of pop-up
threats for which the SoS behavior response will be unable to counter. This implies
a greater number of events that make up the set Ya, such as in equation 25.
Since Iij = 0 for all UAS, per equation 39 FX(ai, L, τ,Ψai) =
n∑
j=1
j 6=i
FW cj (ai, L, τ,Ψai).
4.6.3.2 SoS2.
SoS2 does use the cooperative algorithm, but as the UAS are only configured
with sensors and no communications, there is no potential for full knowledge of the
activities of every other UAS. For this SoS, Iij will be in the range of 0.2 to 0.5
(representing a mid-range knowledge); depending on the conditions relative to the
two aircraft for each Iij calculation, the knowledge content will vary.
FX(ai, L, τ,Ψai) for SoS2 will be higher than that of SoS1, owing simply to the
fact that the Iij term is non-zero.
Also, with the ability to adjust SoS behavior in response to changes among the
constituent UAS, the set Ya will be smaller, as there are more situations from which
SoS2 can recover.
4.6.3.3 SoS3.
SoS3, equipped with full communications and sensors, will have Iij will be in the
range of 0.8 to 1.0 in this example. FX(ai, L, τ,Ψai) for SoS3 will be higher than either
86
that of SoS1 or SoS2. Similarly, set Ya will be smaller than both other instantiations.
4.6.3.4 Comparison of Success Probabilities.
Given that FX3 > FX2 > FX1 and FY 3 < FY 2 < FY 1, per equation 43 it can
be determined that the lower bound of Psuccess(SoS3) is less than the lower bound
of Psuccess(SoS2) is less than the lower bound of Psuccess(SoS1). These conclusions
directly inform the designer of the effectiveness of design choices in relatively quick
order.
In a different perspective of this problem, consider what occurs under degradation
of the communications network of SoS3, such as due to adversary action. A steady
reduction in the functionality and probability of success for the SoS is apparent first
with loss of the communications network (e.g. due to jamming) and then with loss
of inter-flight sensing capability (e.g. due to obscurants or directed energy).
4.6.4 Information Overload.
Information overload, as discussed earlier, is defined here as a form of decision
paralysis characterized by the inability to respond to a disturbance due to insufficient
processing of relevant information or overprocessing of irrelevant information. As
discussed, there is a cost to collecting and processing information.
If Za is the event that the information collected provides no increase in the proba-
bility of mission success, P (Za) is the probability that this event has occurred. Thus
the term in equation 46 captures the effect of collecting useless information. It is
assumed the probability of event Za is independent of the scenario distribution. In
contrast to FX , FZ is the expected functionality conditioned on the events where
collected information provides no increase in mission success.
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FZ(a, L, τ,Ψa) ≡
∑
Ψa
F(a, L, τ, Si|Za) P (Za) p(Si) (46)
The goal of the system is to collect as much information on the environment as
possible that is relevant to the success of the mission, rejecting all other information.
The environment, if it has a goal (i.e. a competitor to the first system), seeks to either
withold useful information or provide useless information. Using this framework,
it may be possible to quantify and predict information overload and evaluate the
effectiveness of system designs.
4.6.5 Implications for system design and effectiveness analysis.
The earlier sections demonstrate that bounds on the probability of success or
probability of survival (survivability) for a system can be calculated using information
on the expected functionality of the system and the environment. In fact, this can
be found using only the functionality estimations, without directly simulating the
system within the specific environment under consideration.
This has important practical implications. Effectiveness analysis is often a costly
and time-consuming process required at multiple phases within a development pro-
gram. The ability to implement a “quick turn effectiveness” tool which produces
Rough Order of Magnitude (ROM) calculations for the effectiveness of large numbers
of system concepts within a particular environment would serve to significantly reduce
time and resource requirements. Using the approach in this paper, prior simulations
of a system in a different environment can be used to calculate the survivability and
probability of success within the environment of concern, without direct simulation.
Provided that the functional level L and epoch size τ are consistent, functionality
estimates for the system and functionality estimates for the environment can provide
that ROM estimate.
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These calculations may also be performed for a system of interest against an
adversary system, again without direct simulation. Suppose a designer is interested
in the performance of a UAS against a new Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) threat.
Using estimates of the UAS’s expected functionality against an older SAM system and
estimates of the new SAM system’s expected functionality, the estimated survivability
of the UAS against the new system can be calculated directly.
The effects of independent systems being used cooperatively may also be inves-
tigated using this functionality framework. Using estimates of the influence of one
cooperative system on another, the survivability and probability of success for the
combined system can be calculated.
4.7 Application Simulation: Competitive and Cooperative UAS
In order to demonstrate potential application of the theory developed in this
research, a simple simulation was developed. The simulation represents a design
problem for a UAS with a mission of traveling to a target waypoint while avoiding
detection. In the defined framework for this example, the UAS starts at point (0,0),
can only travel in the ‘north’ or ’east’ directions (no back-tracking), can only move in
one direction at a time (no diagonals), and ends at point (3,3). The mission is failed
if the UAS passes through point (2,2), the location of the simulated detector.
Figure 10 presents an example successful mission where the UAS traveled ‘north’
from (0,0) to (0,1), then ‘east’ to (1,1), and eventually to the target at (3,3). The
UAS may only travel north or east one unit per time step, allowing for exactly 6
moves per simulation.
As structured, the simulation allows for a maximum of
(
total moves
moves north
)
=
(
6
3
)
= 20
possible paths. Of those, 8 result in mission success as defined, and 12 result in
failure. Figure 11 illustrates an overplot of all possible successful paths and Figure
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Figure 10. An example path resulting in mission success. The UAS avoids the detector
at (2,2) before reaching the target point at (3,3).
12 does the same for paths resulting in failure.
The scenarios are not distributed uniformly; due to conditional probabilities of
transition at each point it turns out that (overall) it is more likely for the UAS to
follow a success path than a failure path. For an unconstrained UAS, the expected
functionality is FX = 7.125 per equation 14 and has a probability of success of
Psuccess = 0.625 (these are calculated exactly). (Note that if the scenarios followed a
uniform distribution, Psuccess =
8
20
= 0.4.) The maximum possible functionality is 12
and the minimum is 4.
4.7.1 Cooperative UAS.
4.7.1.1 Energy-constrained UAS.
Now assume the UAS is provided with enough fuel for only 4 functional inter-
actions. That is, each time the UAS performs a maneuver (a stop, start, or turn),
it expends one unit of energy. If the chosen path requires more than 4 units of en-
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Figure 11. All possible scenarios resulting in mission success.
Figure 12. All possible scenarios resulting in mission failure.
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ergy to reach the target, the UAS runs out of fuel and the mission is failed. Under
this constraint, the expected functionality for the UAS is FX = 4.000 ± 0.001 (at
95% confidence) since the UAS can have no more than 4 functional interactions.
PSuccess = 0.26, since there are only two paths where the end point is reached suc-
cessfully. (Note that uncertainty is not given for PSuccess since it is calculated as true
or false for each scenario, not as a statistical quantity.)
Now suppose a second UAS can influence the first through refueling; the first UAS
gains functionality due to the increased energy available through the added fuel. In
this case, every time the two UAS are in proximity to each other, UAS 2 transfers 1
unit of energy to UAS 1. The is expressed as an increase in potentional functionality
of 1 when both UAS occupy the same point on the grid. UAS 2 also starts from (0,0)
and moves along one of the 20 paths to (3,3).
If UAS 1 has no information on UAS 2 (and vice versa), then I12 in equation 38
is zero and only the second term applies. Taking into account now all the possible
path permutations for both UAS, this yields an expectation of an extra 2.0 units of
energy (meaning an average possible increase in functionality of 2.0). The simulation
produced an expected functionality for UAS 1 of FW c2 +FW c1 = FX(UAS1) = 5.611±
0.016 (with 95% confidence). The probability of success increases to PSuccess = 0.38.
This is in agreement with equation 43, which states that the floor value (minimum
probability of success) should increase.
4.7.1.2 Cooperative UAS with Increased Information .
If UAS 1 has information on the position of UAS 2, through a combination of
communcation and observation, I12 is positive and FX for UAS 1 increases. Assume
that the state of UAS 1 includes only a position. (An expanded treatment would
include the velocity vector as well, but that is not necessary for the purposes of this
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example application.) The quantity I12 can be stated in terms of entropy: I12 =
1 − H12
H∞
; in other words, I12 is 1 minus the uncertainty in the position of UAS 2
divided by the total number of possible states for UAS 2 (in this example, there are
16 possible points UAS 2 could occupy). If UAS 1 has perfect knowledge of UAS 2’s
position, I12 = 1, and every path will have the maximum possible increase in available
energy (5 units; 1 unit every time step). Assuming UAS 1 has power to act on that
information, this increases the likelihood that UAS 1 will choose paths (scenarios)
that maximize the time spent in proximity to UAS 2.
Referring to equation 38, under perfect knowledge FX(UAS1) = 6.816 ± 0.018
(with 95% confidence) after simulation. The probability of success is the same as the
full energy case, 0.625. The paths which did not gain enough functionality to reach
the target (those with F > 9) failed originally anyway because all of those paths pass
over the detector at (2,2).
4.7.2 Competitive UAS.
4.7.2.1 Information-constrained UAS.
Now suppose that the mission of UAS 2 is to intercept UAS 1, which causes an
additional failure mode for UAS 1. In this situation, UAS 2 starts at (3,3) and its
movement is subject to the similar constraints as UAS 1 except that UAS 2 can travel
in all four directions (including the ‘south’ and ‘west’ directions). (Note that UAS 2
will have higher functionality with the removal of these constraints.)
If UAS 1 and UAS 2 occupy the same point on the grid, UAS 2 is successful
and UAS 1 fails. Similarly, if UAS 1 passes the detector at (2,2), UAS 2 wins and
UAS 1 fails. Assume first that UAS 2 has no information on UAS 1 and therefore
moves randomly. After running a number of simulations, Psuccess(UAS1) = 0.52 and
Psuccess(UAS2) = 0.48. This is lower than the 0.625 for Psuccess(UAS1) from earlier,
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as expected with an additional failure mode.
4.7.2.2 Competitive UAS with Increased Information.
UAS 2 now is given information on the current position of UAS 1, with no uncer-
tainty. In this case I21 = 1 and UAS 2 intercepts UAS 1 every time due to its higher
expected functionality.
If instead of perfect information, UAS 2 knows the position of UAS 1 only within
1 point (out of 16 possible points on the grid). If UAS 1 is in a corner point, there
are 3 possible points for it from the perspective of UAS 2; if UAS 1 is in the center of
the grid, there are 5 possible points. I21 = 1−
H21
H∞
> 1− 5
16
= 0.6875. This results
in Psuccess(UAS1) = 0.34 and Psuccess(UAS2) = 0.66, giving UAS 1 a fighting chance.
4.8 Conclusions and future work
As engineered systems, particularly military acquisitions, increasingly rely on in-
formation about their environment, devising strategies for increasing system resiliency
is of critical importance. This paper provides a foundation for understanding the ef-
fects of information on system functionality using a metric that can be employed
practically during system design.
The derivations explored in this paper can help guide development of new systems
in order to increase their chances of success in the target environment. Significant
further work is required, however, to construct practical design guidance.
Extensions of this work have important implications for information overload,
competitive systems design, and cooperative systems design. Future efforts will in-
clude exploring linkages between information, functionality, complexity, decline, and
collapse, all of which are of high interest for systems design.
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V. Application
In order to explore and validate the theories and assertions developed in Chapters
III and IV, an expanded version of the simulation used in Chapter IV was developed.
The purpose of the simulation is to meet the following objectives:
• Show that higher functionality corresponds with higher probability of success;
• Show the effect of limited available energy on functionality and probability of
success;
• Show the effect of limited information on functionality and probability of suc-
cess.
5.1 UAS Simulation
As in Chapter IV, the simulation represents a UAS traveling to a target waypoint
while avoiding detection. In the expanded version, the UAS starts at point (0,0), can
only travel in the ‘north’ or ‘east’ directions as before, can only move in one direction
at a time, and ends at point (20,20). The mission is failed if the UAS passes through
a detector. The number of detectors is varied from 0 to 10. Figure 13 illustrates the
set of success paths for an example obstacle distribution.
For 21 x 21 grid, the simulation allows for a maximum of
(
total moves
moves north
)
=
(
38
19
)
=
3.5345x1010 possible paths. The maximum functionality for any path is 74, and the
minimum is 4 as before.
5.2 Results
A simulation of a single UAS (without a refueling companion) was run to examine
the effects of constraining the available energy. The simulation was configured for
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Figure 13. Scenarios leading to mission success
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20,000 runs and no obstacles. Figure 14 shows the results for various initial energy
conditions (the 95% confidence error bars are barely visible).
There is a clear trend in that the expected functionality decreases smoothly with
decreasing energy. This is in agreement with the assertion of Chapter IV, which
stated: If all other parameters are held constant, as the energy available to a system
increases, the system will maintain or increase in expected functionality, provided that
the destructive energy limit for the system is not exceeded. The converse is also true:
as the energy available to a system decreases, the system will maintain or decrease in
expected functionality.
The trend between probability of success and expected functionality is also clear.
At high functionality, there is a sharp drop in success probability with small changes in
functionality. At low functionality, the opposite is true: large changes in functionality
yield small changes in probability of success.
The simulation was run with ten obstacles placed according to Table 3. Figure 15
shows the results for various initial energy conditions (the 95% confidence error bars
are barely visible), with a refueling tanker delivering an energy boost of 1 unit. The
UAS and tanker follow random (zero information) paths.
Table 3. Obstacle positions
Obstacle Number Coordinates
1 (9, 9)
2 (12, 12)
3 (14, 10)
4 (10, 14)
5 (8, 15)
6 (16, 14)
7 (4, 15)
8 (15, 2)
9 (12, 6)
10 (6, 12)
As with the zero obstacle case, the expected relationships between available energy,
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Figure 14. Expected Functionality vs. Mission Success for a variety of energy conditions
and no obstacles
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Figure 15. Expected Functionality vs. Mission Success for a variety of energy conditions
and ten obstacles
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expected functionality, and probability of success are clearly evident. The effects
are less pronounced, however, in the ten obstacle case. At high functionality, the
probability of success is much less sensitive to changes in functionality for the ten
obstacle case than the zero obstacle case. At low functionality, the 10 and 0 obstacle
cases approach the same sensitivity to functionality changes. For clarity, the scenarios
with 0 obstacles and 10 obstacles are overlaid in Figure 16.
It is clear that there is an overall flattening of the expected functionality vs.
probability of success as the number of obstacles increases. This is due primarily
to the reduction in the maximum possible probability of success with the increase
in obstacles; with a lower maximum, there is less range for the effect of reducing
expected functionality to be seen.
Next, the refueler was simulated for different values of energy delivered upon each
encounter with the first UAS. Figure 17 shows the effects of varying the amount of
energy delivered by the refueler.
As expected, a boost energy of 3 results in the highest overall higher expected
functionality and probability of success. UAS 1 needs relatively few encounters in
order to have enough energy to reach the target point. This result further reinforces
the assertion that increased energy available yields increased expected functionality.
In order to explore the relationsihp between functionality and information, an
uncertainty in the position of the refueler (as observed by UAS 1) was introduced. For
an initial available energy of 20, Figure 18 shows the results for various uncertainties
in the information UAS 1 has on the refueler.
As in the 4 x 4 grid example, this result is consistent with equation 43, which
states that the floor value (minimum probability of success) should increase as I12
increases. As the uncertainty approaches infinity (which was calulated by setting I12
to zero), probability of success appears to become slightly less sensitive to decreases
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Figure 16. Expected Functionality vs. Mission Success for a variety of energy condi-
tions, for 0 and 10 obstacles
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Figure 17. Expected Functionality vs. Mission Success for multiple tanker boost ener-
gies
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Figure 18. Expected Functionality vs. Mission Success for a variety of uncertainty
conditions and ten obstacles
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in expected functionality. The trend, though, appears nearly linear.
Interestingly, due to the construct of the simulation, as uncertainty continues to
increase beyond the theoretical limits the probability of success increases. This is
illustrated in Figure 19 Since the uncertainty in position of the tanker increasingly
includes space outside of the allowable grid, the UAS is pulled toward the edges of
the grid. Because those low-functionality paths are less populated with detectors (ob-
stacles), they are more likely to be successful. This illustrates how the idiosyncracies
of the particular problem under consideration can lead to counter-intuitive behavior.
5.3 Summary
This chapter successfully demonstrated that the expected trends hold for the
simulation used. Expected functionality clearly decreases (or stays the same) in
response to changes in available energy. Probability of success clearly decreases as
expected functionality decreases. Both functionality and probabilty of success fall as
the information available to a system is reduced.
While the theory holds for this system construct, future work should include
conducting further validation with a variety of system types.
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Figure 19. Expected Functionality vs. Mission Success for a variety of uncertainty
conditions and ten obstacles
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VI. Conclusions and Recommendations
6.1 Conclusions
This research successfully developed a methodology to measure the functionality
and complexity of dynamic systems for use inevaluating resilience or robustness of a
proposed concept. The research extended and integrated existing theory and mea-
surement methodologies into a practical approach to aid rapid effectiveness analysis
for resiliency.
The work presented here successfully addressed the research objectives discussed
in Chapter I, which were to answer the following questions:
• How can functionality be measured?
– This research demonstrated that functionality is measured by determining
the number of functional interactions, an aspect of the behavior of the kinetic
energy of a system element in each degree of freedom. The expected function-
ality for a system can be calculated using the realized functionality for multiple
scenarios in context with the probability distribution for the scenario set.
• How can complexity be measured and what is its relationship to functionality?
– This research identified various types of complexity from the literature
and demonstrated that expected functionality, which measures the behavioral
complexity of a system, may be used as a proxy for measuring complexity.
The measure aligns with the accepted approach of measuring complexity by
calculating the information content of a system.
• What is the effect of reduced energy availability on functionality and complex-
ity?
106
– This research developed validated theory that a decrease in energy avail-
ability leads to a decrease in functionality, and therefore complexity.
• What is the effect of reduced information on functionality and complexity?
– This research developed validated theory that as a system’s information
on its environment (or a competitive system) increases, the probability that a
system will apply the most suitable functions increases, provided that the cost
of obtaining that information is much less than the energy available. This leads
to a higher functional efficiency, increases the probability of success. Lower
information increasing the likelihood of poor application of functions and en-
countering destructive effects, lowering functionality (and complexity).
• How can knowledge of functionality and complexity be applied to the systems
engineering process?
– This research demonstrated the utility of using measurement of function-
ality and complexity to guide systems design toward resiliency. The expected
functionality metric can be used to select systems that are more likely to suc-
ceed across a diverse range of scenarios. Expected functionality may be used as
a “quick turn effectiveness” methodology to rapidly identify the most suitable
system approaches.
While this research successfully met the research objectives, there are areas where
the conclusions could be stronger. A greater variety of applications with more inherent
variety of behavior would allow for more conclusive validation.
6.2 Contributions
This research resulted in several contributions. First, it established a theoreti-
cal basis for the measurement of functionality and its use in system design. This
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measurement was linked with the notion of complexity and offered approaches for its
management. This research developed validated derivations of the impacts of energy
and information scarcity on system behavior and effectiveness. The functionality
metric was used to derive theoretical impacts on the probability of mission success,
taking into account available information, cooperative behaviors, and competitive be-
haviors. Finally, this research outlined and demonstrated a methodolgy for applying
the theoretical approaches to aid in system design.
6.3 Recommendations for Future Research
Continuing work should focus on further validation of the theory with a variety of
system types and an increased number of system elements, as well as including models
with more degrees of freedom. Future research should also validate the expected
effects of information overload on functionality and establish approaches to counter
it.
More conclusively linking functionality to complexity would strengthen the theo-
retical foundation for this work. This research effectively argued the parity between
the concepts and identified correlation using one accepted method for measuring com-
plexity. Examination and comparison using other complexity measurements would
allow further linkage between functionality and the rich field of complexity.
Chapter II explored a number of existing approaches to anticipate system collapse.
In particular, work by Scheffer, et. al [57] identified that slowing in the rate of
change in state variables, an increase in autocorrelation coefficient, and increase in
variance. Recalling Tainter, [65], collapse is defined as a rapid reduction in complexity.
Further research should investigate using changes in functionality (complexity) itself
over time as an indicator for impending collapse, including changes in eignevalues,
autocorrelation coefficient, and variance of functionality. No known prior research
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used measures of the complexity or functionality of the system in order to predict
collapse. More accurate anticipation of collapse could allow for the application of
preventive measures or mitigations, such as developing alternatives to the USAF
acquisition system [47].
Finally, large-scale application of expected functionality to a large number of
systems of different types would enable the development of design heuristics with
respect to functionality. This research established fundamental guidance with respect
to functionality, energy, and information, but there are likely many more unexplored
design principles building upon this work.
109
Appendix A. Early work: Practical measurement of
complexity in dynamic systems
This appendix is a paper developed in the course of this research which was re-
viewed, accepted, and published in the proceedings of the 2012 Conference on Systems
Engineering Research [17]. This paper represents an early point in the evolution of
this research prior to incorporating ideas on functionality and stronger ties to systems
engineering methods (rather than solely focused on thermodynamic complexity).
1.1 Abstract
A difficulty in complexity theory is lack of a clear definition for complexity, partic-
ularly one that is measurable. Those approaches that provide measurable definitions
for the absolute complexity of a system often impose the requirement of perfect or
near-perfect knowledge of system structure.
In practice, it is intractable or impossible to measure the complexity of most
dynamic systems. However, by measuring behavioral complexity in context with
environmental scenarios, it is possible to set bounds on a system’s absolute (maxi-
mum) complexity and estimate its total complexity. As this paper shows, behavioral
complexity can be determined by observing a system’s changes in kinetic energy.
This research establishes a methodology for measuring complexity in dynamic
systems without the requirement of system structure knowledge. This measurement
can be used to compare systems, understand system risks, determine failure dynamics,
and guide system architecture.
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1.2 Introduction
A difficulty in complexity theory is a clear definition for complexity, particularly
one that is measurable. In many cases throughout the literature, it seems the au-
thors are speaking of different or even mutually exclusive phenomena. The most apt
summary of the issue is the tongue-in-cheek assertion by complexity researcher Seth
Lloyd: “I can’t define it for you, but I know it when I see it.” [20]
1.2.1 Definitions of Complexity.
A root cause in the lack of unified complexity definitions is that there are in fact
several types of complexity. The first formal treatment of complexity focused on algo-
rithmic complexity, which reflects the computation requirements for a mathematical
process. [20] Senge and Sterman include also dynamic complexity, which is primarily
characterized by difficult to discern cause-effect relations. [59] [62] To further muddy
the waters, there is the concept of complex adaptive systems. These are defined by
properties such as consisting of agent networks, having multiple levels of organiza-
tion, development of internal models, exhibiting ‘phase transitions’, and exploitation
of niches in the fitness landscape. [67]
One of the most workable definitions is thermodynamic depth, which actually
seems to unify the two complexity camps. Thermodynamic depth as complexity
asserts that complexity is a measure of how hard it is to put something together.
[?] [?] There are several variations on this approach, with the commonality that
complexity disappears for both ordered and purely random systems. [44] [20]
Bar-Yam defines the complexity of a physical system as the length of the shortest
string, s, that can represent its properties. This can be the result of measurements
and observations over time. [5]
However, there are some inherent difficulties in using these definitions. For one, it
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is very difficult to approach a macro-level system, particularly one with hidden struc-
ture, and determine the information content. While information and thermodynamic
entropy-based measures form a theoretical basis for complexity measurement, there
remains a need for a more accessible route.
There are hints that energy plays a role in defining complexity. As a general rule,
systems commonly recognized as complex process more energy than less complex
ones. For instance, civilizations move more energy than a single town. However,
mere energy flow is not a measure of complexity, since a single arbitrary large-bore
“pipe” (a relatively simple system) could be constructed that matches the energy flow
through any complex system.
A metric that solves the large-bore problem is proposed by Chaisson. By measur-
ing the energy rate density in Equation 47, where Φm is the energy rate density, E is
energy flow through a system, τ is the time epoch, and m is system mass, Chaisson
obtains results that correlate well with other notions of complexity. [13]
Φm =
E
τm
(47)
However, the energy rate density metric has some drawbacks. By normalizing
with respect to mass, this metric produces incorrect results for complexity when
comparing some systems. For example, suppose an electronic brain is built to mimic
the operation of a human brain. The human brain may process energy at the same
rate as a theoretical electronic brain, but due to differences in basic materials (i.e.
the weight of neurons vs. semi-conductors), the two systems, which most theorists
would recognize as identically complex, could have vastly different Φm values. Thus,
by normalizing with respect to mass instead of function, the Φm metric produces
incorrect results for the relative complexity of systems.
A practical difficulty in using the Φm metric is determining the appropriate mass
112
and energy to use. In measuring the Φm of a civilization, Chaisson uses the mass
of humanity and the total energy processed by the civilization. However, the total
energy of a civilization does not flow through only its humans, but also its machinery,
beasts of burden, vehicles, etc., the mass of which is a difficult quantity to measure.
All metrics discussed thus far contribute ideas toward a measure that:
• Correlates with notions of complexity at all scales
• Is measurable for any dynamical system
• May be practically employed
1.3 Energetic Complexity
Dynamic systems, by definition, yield changes in their kinetic energy over time.
Using this fact, we can define an Activated Energy Transfer as an instance where,
for a discrete element of a system, its kinetic energy in the direction of a generalized
coordinate transitions from a non-zero value to a zero value, or from a zero to a
non-zero value.
As an example, given a particle enclosed in a container, every collision with the
sides of the container is considered an activated energy transfer. The definition of
activated energy transfers allows the following definition of Energetic Complexity:
the number of activated energy transfers for a given system within a particular epoch
and above a particular functional level. It is denoted by Ç.
This is, in essence, complexity by demonstration. A static system may have
potential for complex behavior, but its complexity cannot be measured until it is
active. Depending on the scenario, a system may respond with differing amounts of
complexity. A plane flying through clear skies may stay straight and level, but be
required to make complex maneuvers when flying through a storm.
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A key to the utility of this definition is the ease with which it may be applied.
For instance, if we choose an epoch size larger than the time required for basic cell
functions, a humans internal structure is dependent on exercising a finite number of
energy transfers. That is, it must ensure a constant flow of energy within the body,
and perform work using that energy, in order to remain alive. If energetic complexity
is reduced, it means that part of the body is processing less energy – the tissue is
either reduced in its function (e.g. a sleeping brain), is dead, or is removed.
Important to this definition is functional level. Specifying the functional level (the
threshold above which a system function can be realized) relates the measurement
to a particular level in the hierarchy of system functions. For instance, a humans
complexity may be measured at the cellular, molecular, or atomic levels, and given
the same epoch size, the Ç. value increases for each progressively smaller scale. The
functional level of interest might be different between generalized coordinates and is
analogous to energy levels.
It should be noted that other researchers have alluded to both the multi-scale
and functional natures of complexity, but there is no apparent prior synthesis of
these ideas. Bar-Yam has written extensively on multi-scale complexity and what he
terms the “complexity profile”, applying it in particular to warfare. As he writes,
“complexity at a particular scale includes all possible force actions at or above this
scale.” [7]] In his book on complexity, systems engineer Suh argues that complexity
can only be defined in the functional domain vs. the physical domain, and relates
complexity to the ability to satisfy a functional requirement. [64]
1.4 Consistency with the Field and Further Extension
While the concept of energetic complexity represents a new approach in looking
at complexity, in order for it to be shown valid, there must be coherence and consis-
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tency with the accepted definitions of complexity in literature. Note that energetic
complexity measures the dynamic complexity of a system.
As explored earlier, complexity is often defined as a deep property of a system
that is in many ways intangible. However, as pointed out by Corning, such definitions
“exclude the extremes associated with highly ordered or strictly random phenomena,
even though there can be more or less complex patterns or order and more or less com-
plex patterns of disorder.” [20] In short, these definitions do not allow for graduations
in complexity. In rejecting “simpler” systems as not being complex, these definitions
eliminate the very basis for which to determine whether a system is complex or not!
“Deep-property” definitions of complexity reflect a combination of energetic com-
plexity and system structure. For example, a linear dynamic system (e.g. where
cause and effect are apparent) can have the same Ç value as a network (Figure 20).
However, complexity theorists are more likely to describe a network as complex than
a linear system. The main difference between these systems is the path in the linear
system is predictable, whereas the network path is dependent on additional factors
whose properties must be known to make predictions. It is the difference between the
absolute complexity or the total complexity of the two systems.
Figure 20. Two systems with identical realized functionality. (a) Single-path (b) Multi-
path Network
Absolute complexity is defined here as the maximum possible complexity for any
given scenario over the range of all possible scenarios, Sm, as in Equation 48. Energetic
complexity may be used to measure absolute complexity. If it was possible to observe
a systems response to all possible scenarios and measure the energetic complexity,
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this information could be used to construct a description of the absolute complexity
of the system. As the certainty of a system’s structure and function decrease the
certainty in (and ability to measure) absolutely complexity is also reduced.
ÇA = max(Ç|Sm), Sm ∈ Ψ (48)
Energetic complexity, as defined above, is a single observation of system respond-
ing to a particular scenario.Total complexity may thus be written as Equation 49
where a particular scenario Sm is defined as a unique set of system conditions (ex-
ogenous and internal), and Ψ is defined as the set of all possible scenarios driving a
unique system response. F is the Cumulative Density Function (CDF) of Ψ.
ÇsysA ≡ E[Ç(sys,Ψ)] =
∫
Ψ
Ç(sys, Sm)dF (Sm) (49)
For a set of finite, discrete, and independent scenarios, total complexity may be
written as in Equation 50 where p(Sm) is the probability mass function over Ψ.
ÇsysT =
∑
Ψ
Ç(sys, Sm)p(Sm) (50)
For a given system, one scenario may cause it to respond with a particular behav-
ior, whereas another may produce a completely different behavior. As defined here,
scenarios which produce identical behavior in the system(s) under study are indistin-
guishable from one another. This enables a framework for system study where the
infinite possibilities of system scenarios may be parsed to a workable, finite set. For
most systems of interest, this finite set may still be too large for practical analysis,
but the solution to this problem will be addressed later.
Total complexity is therefore the collection of every possible pairing of a scenario
with the complexity response for a given system. This is, in fact, isomorphic with the
116
statistical complexity calculated by entropic methods. Yet, we reached the definition
using two types of data: the energetic complexity values and the set of all possible
scenarios.
With this new insight, it is clear that energetic complexity is not inconsistent
with complexity as defined in the literature. Systems which consist of networks, have
multiple levels of organization, anticipate the future, and have many “niches” (per
Waldrop [67]) have more total complexity than systems that don’t; systems with non-
linear responses, disproportionate effects, and non-obvious cause-effect linkages (per
Senge [59]) have more total complexity than systems without.
1.4.1 Complexity, Chaos, and Randomness.
As discussed, it is assumed complexity exists on a spectrum of behavior, that
progresses from static (or linear) to complex to chaotic. A chaotic system is one whose
state at time t > t0 cannot be calculated beyond an arbitrary precision α. That is,
an arbitrarily small error in initial conditions (at time t0) can yield large errors in the
calculation of the final state at time t. An energetically complex system may exhibit
chaotic dynamics and therefore also be a chaotic system. The two concepts are not
mutually exclusive.
Energetic complexity is a physical phenomenon, whereas chaos is a mathematical
one. In this view, Ç serves as the backbone of the complexity spectrum of behavior,
and can be used as a tool to determine the class of behavior. What is important is
the relationship between Ç and highly chaotic systems.
One reason that entropy-based complexity metrics are so appealing is they ap-
proach zero for random processes as well as static ones. Most working in the com-
plexity field accept this as a requirement for a good metric, although what happens
between those limiting cases has little bearing. [44]
117
At first glance, it appears the Ç measure increases without bound as energy in-
creases. However, recall that Ç is based on physical processes and is subject to
physical limits; there is a limit to the amount of energy that physical systems may
contain (e.g. particles in a box, stars, life forms). At the high entropy (disordered)
limit, as energy of the particles increases (e.g. isochoric temperature increase), the
particles accumulate so much kinetic energy that their collisions degrade their phys-
ical structure (e.g. molecular disruption). At this point, complexity falls. For a
macroscopic “particle”, as it degrades into smaller and less ordered components with
the energy increase, the ability of this system to perform a function degrades. This
degradation results in the activated energy transfers falling below the functional level.
Completing the relationship, as energy is removed from a system, the kinetic energy
of particles is reduced, and gradually drops below the functional threshold.
It should be noted that the exact relationship between complexity and entropy
is system dependent and dependent on the entropy-changing process itself (which,
per Li [44], is acceptable). For an isothermal volume-changing process at the high-
entropy limit, as volume is increased, Ç decreases and approaches zero. Conversely,
as volume is decreased, Ç increases until it reaches a point where the particles are
contained so tightly that the kinetic energy of the particles falls below the functional
(energy) threshold. Similar arguments can be made for other basic entropy-changing
processes.
It is important to distinguish truly random processes from apparently random
ones. A vehicle driving erratically might appear to exhibit random behavior to the
outside observer; but what appears as random might in fact be very causal. What
if the vehicle is under fire? Erratic motion (being unpredictable to the enemy), is
in that case a highly effective strategy for survival, and is in fact a very complex
behavior.
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1.4.2 Agents and Energetic Complexity.
Agent-based models are of great importance to complexity theory, and measures
of complexity should reflect increasing complexity with increasing activity of agents.
“Boids” (Bird-androids) are a type of agent based model using rule sets based
on the motions of animal flocks, herds, and swarms. [15] Compare a 3-boid flock
against 3 equivalent non-interacting aircraft. In going from point A to point B,
which takes place over a particular epoch in both cases, non-interacting aircraft will
make flight path adjustments due to atmospheric disturbances. A boid-aircraft will
make these adjustments as well, but also make adjustments due to each of the boid
guidance rules. Therefore the boid flock has higher energetic complexity than the set
of non-interacting aircraft. Recalling the fact that non-cooperative flight is a subset
of cooperative flight (equivalent to setting certain rule weightings to zero), if no boid
rules are invoked, both systems have equivalent complexity.
Note also that human-piloted aircraft in formation interact with each other in
similar fashion to the boid rules. Adjustments are made based on the relative positions
and velocities of the other aircraft. Therefore, such a set of interacting aircraft can
have the same (or greater) Ç than the boid flock.
1.4.3 Combat System Example: Tank.
Consider a tank system designed to strike a fixed target with four degrees of
freedom (DoF): x, y, φ, and θ, where x and y are Cartesian position coordinates, φ
is gun elevation, and θ is turret azimuth. A strike may be achieved by adjusting the
state space x =[x y φ θ]T through a control vector u.
First, consider the case where all degrees of freedom are enabled: u= [a
t
b
t
c
t
d
t
]T ,
where a, b, c, and d are constants (i.e. constant rate of motion from start to stop). If
each DoF is exercised by the control vector, Ç(f(x,u)) = 8. This sets a lower bound
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on ÇA.
In the next case, the same tank system is restricted to move in only 3 Degrees-of-
Freedom (DoF), having lost the ability to rotate the turret due to damage or energy
rationing. The vector u = [a
t
b
t
c
t
0]T reflects the loss of control. If each available DoF
is exercised by u, Ç(f(x,u)) = 6, a lower bound for ÇA of this new system. This
result is intuitive, since the loss of a degree of freedom should reflect a loss in the
complexity of the system. The same trend is evident if we restrict the motion still
further, such that u = [0 0 c
t
0]T . In this case, Ç= 2.
Now consider different control policies, where the components of u do not drive
the system at a constant rate. Suppose c(t) is chosen to drive the tank gun elevation
at a non-linear rate according to Figure 21(a). Here, Ç = 2 again. Has the metric
failed to capture system complexity?
Figure 21. (a) Non-linear function of gun elevation, φ(t); (b) Motor brush position ξ(t)
This example illustrates why Ç is evaluated at a particular functional level; it
prevents double-counting complexity. At the tank system functional level, this change
in control function has no effect on Ç. To discover the effect, it is necessary to explore
one functional level deeper: the gun elevation motor subsystem.
Suppose this is a standard Direct Current (DC) motor. Every time the brushes in
the motor make or break contact (switching polarity and keeping the armature mov-
120
ing), kinetic energy goes through zero, generating Ç counts. Figure 21(b) illustrates
this motion. The “missing” complexity exists at this lower subsystem.
Extending the tank example still further, suppose that the full-authority system
is able to satisfy the range-to-target equation by adjusting the value of only one DoF.
However, the controller opts to make movements in all 4 DoFs to reach the target.
This results in an “excess” complexity, behavior which is not necessary to reach the
goal.
This example demonstrates why it is important to keep in mind the goals and
limitations of a complexity measure. Complexity is a reflection of a system’s potential
behaviors, not of efficient behaviors. The choice of control vector, given a system’s
complexity, is what controls efficiency. Irrational actors can implement control policies
that produce highly complex behaviors, yet yield no benefit.
The effectiveness of a complex adaptive system can be measured by the choice of
control vector against some objective function. That effectiveness, however, is not a
measure of its complexity but what it does with that complexity.
In this tank example, total complexity may be calculated by determining a prob-
ability mass function for the scenario set and summing the product of that function
with the complexity response for each scenario (as in Equation 50). Practically, the
scenario set will consist of the most likely operating conditions. The constructed
measure of total complexity may then be used to compare systems and determine
suitability. Similarly, absolute complexity (as in Equation 48) provides additional
insight into the complexity potential of the system, but total complexity gives a more
complete picture for guiding system design.
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1.5 Conclusions and Future Work
This research demonstrates the validity and use of a new measure of complexity
in dynamic systems that may be more practically employed than prior measures. En-
ergetic complexity can be used to compare systems in identical scenario sets, measure
historical complexity, or set bounds on the absolute complexity.
As this is only an initial exploratory work, further validation is required. The
behavior of this metric under scenarios of system collapse [?] or general evolution
could yield insight into developing robust system architectures that are resistant to
failure in varied and uncertain fitness landscapes.
122
Appendix B. Related work: Flight test results for UAVs
using boid guidance algorithms
This appendix is a paper developed in the course of this research which was re-
viewed, accepted, and published in the proceedings of the 2012 Conference on Systems
Engineering Research [16]. This paper documents flight test results using the boid
guidance algorithms used in simulation to generate the research data.
2.1 Abstract
A critical technology for operating groups of Uninhabited Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)
is distributed guidance. Distributed guidance allows an operator to command several
vehicles at the same time, reduces operator workload, and adds redundancy to the
system. Some of the leading software candidates for achieving distributed guidance
are known as Boid Guidance Algorithms (BGAs), which are agent-based techniques
relying on the interactions of simple behaviors.
Flight tests are crucial to the advancement of flight technologies such as BGAs,
and this was identified as an important area for development. This paper presents the
results from the 2005 flight tests of BGAs at NASA Dryden Flight Research Center
with two RnR Products’ APV-3 UAVs employing CloudCap Technology’s Piccolo
autopilot system.
Major challenges in these flight tests include the use of a waypoint-following sys-
tem, limited computation resources, and management of safety procedures. The
conclusions of this work include the need for using a path-following platform and
completion of a full system optimization. This work is an important step in the
development of a deployable distributed guidance system.
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2.2 Introduction
The ability for a single operator to manage multiple aircraft is a sought-after goal.
Possible benefits of this technology include improved operator efficiency, the oppor-
tunity for distributed function, redundancy in hardware, reduced production and
operating costs, and improved safety. However, the management of several aircraft
simultaneously is wrought with challenges.
This research stems from a collaborative project of NASA Dryden Flight Research
Center (DFRC) and Ames Research Center (ARC) entitled Networked UAV Teams
(NUAVT) [25]. The focus of the project was to show the feasibility of using coop-
erative UAVs to assist in forest fire fighting activities. However, the technologies
developed are general enough for use in many different applications.
Previous approaches to this problem are computationally expensive and incur a
significant scaling penalty with regard to group size [33] [34]. Since small UAVs
typically have limited computing capacity, this problem is of high importance. BGAs
have shown a great deal of success in coordinating large numbers of simulated aircraft
[21] [68], but there are few known flight tests.
2.3 Boid Guidance Algorithms
Boid Guidance Algorithms (where “Boid” stands for “Bird android”) are rule-
based guidance methods inspired from observations of animal flocks and swarms [54].
It was proposed that these complex emergent behaviors could be explained if each
animal agent were to follow a set of very simple rules as shown in Figure 22 [52]. The
combination of these rules can lead to seemingly intelligent behavior.
The behavioral rules are combined by weighting the acceleration command of each
behavior and summing. Determining the weightings is typically the most challenging
aspect of working with BGAs.
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Figure 22. Clockwise from left: Flocking behavior, collision avoidance behavior, and
heading matching behavior.
Previous work on BGAs involved exponentially scaling the behavior weightings
[21]. That is, as one boid approached another, its collision avoidance behavior would
get a higher weighting. The inverse would occur as the boid moved farther from
its neighbors. This research did not use such a method as it incurs a greater on-
line computation penalty yet presents similar optimization challenges. Instead, this
implementation used a look-up table scheduled by a contingency management system.
BGAs were chosen for this work due to their low computation requirements, but
were further modified so that most computation takes place off-line. This modification
reduces the workload on the flight system. In addition, this system has a limited
scaling penalty.
The rules used here are velocity matching (Equation 51), flock centering (Equation
52, where ~xcenter is defined as in Equation 53), collision avoidance (Equation 54),
target seeking (Equation 55), and obstacle avoidance (Equation 56), where ~x, ~v, and
~a(·) are the current boid position, velocity, and partial acceleration, respectively.
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~amatch =
~vnearest − ~v
‖ ~vnearest − ~v ‖
(51)
~aflock =
~xcenter − ~x
‖ ~xcenter − ~x ‖
(52)
~xcenter =
1
n
n∑
i=0
~xi (53)
~acol = −
~xnearest − ~x
‖ ~xnearest − ~x ‖
(54)
~aseek =
~xwaypoint − ~x
‖ ~xwaypoint − ~x ‖
(55)
~aobs = −
~xobstacle − ~x
‖ ~xobstacle − ~x ‖
(56)
2.3.1 Contingency Management System.
Much like a linearized control system, using only one set of behavior weightings
is valid for only a certain range of conditions. For a robust system, the weightings
must change in response to changes in the environment.
To accomplish this, trigger flags were defined to indicate the state of the environ-
ment. For instance, if an aircraft passes within a specified range of its neighbor, the
value of a flag is changed. Here, 48 different flag combinations were identified. For
each combination, a set of weightings is specified.
For all behaviors except obstacle avoidance, nominal conditions are indicated by
a “Level 2” flag. For instance, if the aircraft are nearby each other without being
too close, headed in about the same direction, and have reached the target area, then
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the flocking, collision avoidance, heading matching, and target seeking behavior flags
will all be Level 2. The obstacle avoidance behavior flag has three levels: Level 3
for nominal, Level 2 if the aircraft is heading toward an obstacle, and Level 1 if a
collision is imminent.
The parameters that trigger the flags (such as allowable distance between aircraft)
must be determined by the user based upon aircraft performance characteristics. For
an aircraft model with significant uncertainty, the parameters may be set arbitrarily
restrictive at first, but eased as the aircraft model is refined.
2.3.2 Other modifications.
In addition to the contingency management system, other changes to the basic
algorithm were required. Commands generated by the BGA were limited according
to speed and turn magnitude, so as to reflect the limits of the control system. The
turn limiting was based on a maximum load factor constrained by either the drag
and minimum thrust or the stall limit [2].
To ensure the aircraft stayed within the prescribed boundaries for flight tests,
when an aircraft came within a certain distance of the boundaries, it was given full
power in the direction orthogonal to the boundary. The concern with this approach
is that full priority is given to area containment at the expense of collision avoidance.
However, the safety of the public and operators is paramount.
In addition to limiting the commands, some smaller modifications to the algorithm
were required. Since the number of waypoints available to each aircraft was limited
(see “Challenges” section), the commanded paths were modified to remove waypoints
on relatively long and straight section. Further details on these modifications and the
bases for calculations are found in Clark [15].
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2.4 Optimization
The weightings for the BGA were optimized using a Simple Genetic Algorithm
(SGA) [31]. Previous work showed success using SGAs for optimization of complex
functions and BGAs in particular [26] [24].
SGAs use an evolutionary approach to optimize according to an objective function.
Given an initial population of binary strings, an SGA will evaluate the fitness of each
individual string. Then, using the processes of reproduction, crossover, and mutation,
the SGA produces a new population of strings. With each successive generation, the
probability for an improvement of overall fitness generally increases.
This research used a SGA with a population of 20, a generation gap of 0.9, a bit
precision of 8, and a variable range of 0 to 100 for the five behavior weightings. The
SGA ran for 500 generations after which the top performing individual was selected for
inclusion in the BGA. The objective function consisted of a sum of the “Level 1” flags
corresponding to each behavior, with an additional weight of 4 on the target seeking
behavior flag. A Level 1 flag in either of the anti-collision behaviors resulted in an
artificially large objective value of 5000, essentially taking it out of future populations.
Due to lack of computing resources for timely completion, only one set of behav-
ior weightings was selected for optimization, with three others being set manually.
The full contingency management system desired would include at least 48 such sets.
Therefore, the obtained set was optimized for a specific set of conditions, and devia-
tions from these nominal conditions can result in undesired performance results.
2.5 Challenges
There were several challenges to testing the BGA system, both self-imposed and
exogenous. Perhaps the most serious impediment to achieving an ideal test of the
BGAs was the use of an autopilot system employing waypoint-following logic. While
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suitable for many applications, waypoint-following is generally inadequate for ro-
bust collision avoidance. Since collision avoidance is a key component of BGAs, the
waypoint-following logic presented a major difficulty in ensuring test success.
In addition, the NASA ARC-developed interface program could accept only 15
waypoints per path for each aircraft, leading to larger distances between waypoints.
Aircraft motion between the waypoints is not dictated by the BGA, thus larger way-
point separation results in an increased chance of collision.
A further constraint of the selected autopilot system was the requirement that
the final waypoint either link back to the first point or be made an orbit point. To
increase certainty in the aircraft positions, the final point in all paths was made an
orbit point. The challenge is found in that the aircraft starts entering the orbit as
soon as it crosses the next-to-last waypoint. This can lead to significant deviation
from the path commanded by the BGA.
As mentioned earlier, the implemented BGA is minimally optimized. This con-
straint limited the tolerance of the algorithm to deviations from its optimized con-
dition. It was therefore important to choose an optimization case that was a more
challenging environment than expected in flight.
Some self-imposed safety features also presented challenges to performing a robust
test of the algorithm. In order to ensure flight safety, the flight paths generated by
the algorithm were inspected by the operators before the aircraft were allowed to
follow them. This created two difficulties: the paths were not updated in flight,
resulting in open-loop guidance; and accurate initial conditions were not available to
the algorithm.
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2.6 Flight test results
Flight tests were conducted by NASA DFRC and ARC in January 2005 at Ed-
wards Air Force Base. The aircraft transited the test area from corner to corner, while
avoiding virtual obstacles and one another. Figure 23 shows results from one such
test, with diamonds and squares as the waypoints for the first and second aircraft,
respectively.
In this scenario, the aircraft are travelling from lower left to upper right with no
obstacles. The difficulty of establishing achievable initial conditions is visible as is the
entry into orbit of the last waypoint. With the exception of the endpoints, the flight
path meets the goal of coordinated group flight without collision or departure from
the test area. In Figure 24, the selected aircraft initial conditions correspond well to
the actual path entry points. However, due to the distance between the final orbit
point and the next-to-last waypoint, there is significant departure from the desired
path. This illustrates the need for the next-to-last waypoint to be near the final orbit
point when using a waypoint-guidance system.
In Figure 25, the aircraft avoid simulated obstacles, although the path deviation
of the northernmost aircraft nearly crosses one of the obstacle boundaries. Again, this
is a result of the next-to-last waypoint being too far from the final orbit point. The
aircraft safely navigate among four simulated obstacles in Figure 26. The distance
between waypoints leads the aircraft to approach an obstacle closer than desired.
Figure 27 shows a clear violation of a simulated obstacle. This failure is due to
the reduced number of available waypoints for the path. None of the waypoints are
within the obstacle boundaries, so it was not an algorithm failure. The results shown
in Figure 28 are very similar to those of Figure 27. The obstacle boundary violation
is again due to the reduced number of available waypoints.
Figure 29 demonstrates a failure of the algorithm, as waypoints were placed within
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the obstacle boundaries. This is due to the use of a minimal set of schedulable be-
havior weightings. If the full set were available, the contingency management system
may have prevented the incursion. Also of note is the excursion of the aircraft with
the dotted path early in the flight. This is another artifact of the waypoint-following
algorithm used by the autopilot combined with inaccurate initial conditions selection.
Figure 23. BGA Test Scenario 1
2.7 Conclusions and Future Work
Although more work is needed to develop a robust system, these flight tests have
demonstrated an emerging capability for safely and efficiently UAVs utilizing boid
algorithms. Future work should include a path-following system for robust collision
avoidance and dynamic path development. On-aircraft computation and calculating
a complete set of weightings would improve results. It would also be instructive to
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Figure 24. BGA Test Scenario 2
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Figure 25. BGA Test Scenario 3
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Figure 26. BGA Test Scenario 4
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Figure 27. BGA Test Scenario 5
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Figure 28. BGA Test Scenario 6
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Figure 29. BGA Test Scenario 7
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use “self-optimizing” techniques such as Particle Swarm Optimization [4] to improve
adaptability. Tests exploring other emergent behaviors, such as orbiting or drag
reduction [15], would be good next steps.
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